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In this thesis, I examine the relationship between principal and agent in a moral-
hazard setting where the principal has the ability to monitor the actions of the agent at an 
interim stage of the project. I show that monitoring can induce the agent to exert higher 
levels of effort and can result in a reallocation of project payoffs between the two parties. 
This reallocation is not a one-way street: Situations exist where monitoring encourages 
greater effort from the agent, resulting in greater project payoffs for both principal and 
agent. For projects that are characterized as high-risk, high-reward projects where agent 
involvement is costly, monitoring is often the optimal strategy; this is an explanation for 
why venture capital type investments are the subject of intense monitoring. 
The structure of my model allows the principal to share interim monitoring 
information with the agent. Thus, the agent can modify effort in later periods conditional 
on this information. I analyze when it is optimal for the principal to share this 
information, the impact sharing has on effort levels, the changes in allocation of project 
payoffs resulting from this sharing and subsequent changes in effort levels, and the 




INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effects of monitoring and incentives 
in a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. This thesis is comprised of two parts. 
The first part studies the relationship between principal and agent when monitoring is not 
implemented or where monitoring is undertaken and the results are shared with the agent 
when the project is completed. The second part of this thesis extends this analysis to 
allow the principal to share monitoring results at an interim stage of the project. 
Chapter 3 reviews of the literature concerning the principal-agent problem with a 
focus on the role of monitoring. Due to the common themes of parts 1 and 2, chapter 3 
serves as a literature review for both parts. 
In chapter 4, I give a general description of the assumptions of the models and an 
overview of the methodology used to optimize the principal and agent’s strategies when 
monitoring is not implemented or monitoring information is shared at the completion of 
the project. 
The results for the no-monitoring case are considered in chapter 5. The results 
illustrate situations where the reservation constraint does not bind and the agent extracts 
rents from the project.1 Analysis in this chapter will also show that the higher the 
                                                 
1 A reservation constraint establishes a baseline level of expected utility that the agent can receive if he 
decides to forego employment in the principal’s project and seek employment elsewhere in the economy. 
When this constraint binds, the agent extracts no rent from the project. Rent in this context represents the 
utility in excess of the minimum utility available to the agent through seeking alternative employment in 
the labor market. 
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uncertainty of project success, as driven by exogenous factors, the greater the incentive 
intensity of the contracts negotiated between the two parties.2
In chapter 6, the effects of monitoring are considered; in this chapter, 
communication of monitoring results only occurs at the end of the project. In this case 
there exists circumstances where monitoring is never the optimal strategy. This occurs in 
regions where contractual incentives were sufficient to induce the agent to exert effort at 
the preferred level while receiving expected payoffs that yielded the reservation level. It 
also occurs in regions where increased project payouts generated from higher levels of 
agent effort are insufficient to compensate the agent for the cost of this increased effort. 
When monitoring does have an impact on the principal-agent relationship, two 
effects are found to exist. Circumstances exist where monitoring encourages the agent to 
exert higher levels of effort. There are also circumstances in which payoffs from the 
project are redistributed between the parties. This redistribution is not a one-way street 
flowing from the agent to the principal. In situations where the agent is encouraged by 
monitoring to exert higher levels of effort, there are circumstances where both the 
principal and agent enjoy the rewards of the extra effort as both parties share in the 
increased project payouts. 
Chapter 9, describes the assumptions of the model and an overview of the 
methodology used to optimize the principal and agent’s strategies when monitoring 
information can be shared before the completion of the project. 
The results for the monitoring case when information can be shared before the 
completion of the project are considered in chapter 10. These results are considered in 
                                                 
2 A contract will be said to have greater incentive intensity than a second contract if an agent receives a 
higher expected payment from the first contract when his effort level produces the highest expected payoffs 
for the principal. 
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terms of the general question as to when it would be advantageous for the principal to 
agree to share interim-monitoring information with the agent. Unless monitoring is 
perfect, the estimate of agent effort generated from monitoring will always produce a 
noisy signal of actual effort. Since there is some probability that the principal will receive 
the wrong signal, the agent will require a higher level of incentives to compensate for this 
risk. When communication is introduced into the model, it allows the agent to decide 
whether it is worthwhile to invest high effort in the second period contingent on the 
outcome of the period one monitoring; the results of monitoring will inform the agent 








PREFACE: MONITORING WITH NO COMMUNICATION 
 
 
In order to understand the role that monitoring will play in a principal-agent 
relationship consider the following general setup.3 The principal employs an agent to 
manage a project. The success of the project will be dependent on, among other factors, 
the effort exerted by the agent in his role of manager of the project. The principal’s goal 
is to induce a certain level of effort from an agent in order to maximize the principal’s 
share of project payoffs. If the principal can directly observe the effort of the agent, no 
moral-hazard issue exists and the principal can achieve his goal through the negotiation 
of a contract with the agent. However, if the level of agent effort is not directly 
observable4, then the principal has two choices. 
First, the principal can negotiate with the agent an incentive contract based on the 
payoff from the project. Incentive contracts are used to align the actions of the agent with 
the desires of the principal. This type of contract pays higher compensation to the agent 
when the payoff from the project and other information used to establish the contractual 
payments are at the principal’s preferred levels.5 Unfortunately, the use of incentive 
contracts will not generally lead to efficient solutions to the principal-agent problem: 
                                                 
3 A general description of principal-agent relationships can be found in Sappington (1991). 
4 If there exist exogenous random events that effect the payoff from the project, which are not directly 
observable by the principal, then the payoff from the project will be a noisy measure of the agent’s actions. 
A classic example of this kind of exogenous random event would be the effects of weather on the crop 
yields of a farm managed by a tenant on behalf of a landlord. The level of crops produced by the farm is not 
only dependent on the work of the tenant but is also effected by the weather, which is outside the control of 
the tenant. If the landlord cannot perfectly assess the weather’s effects on crop yields then the yields will 
also lead to imperfect estimates of the tenant’s effort. 
5 For example, with an incentive contract, a manager in charge of sales for a corporation receives a bonus 
once some target level of sales is exceeded. A definition of incentive contract in the context of the discrete 
model investigated in this dissertation can be found in chapter 5. 
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Efficient in the sense that, if the principal could directly observe the agent’s effort, then 
the principal could negotiate a contract with the agent, and the agent could exert a level 
of effort, that would lead to project payoffs that would be strictly preferred by both 
principal and agent.6
Second, the principal can negotiate with the agent an incentive contract, based on 
the payoff of the project, and information received from monitoring the agent’s actions. 
According to the informativeness principal, total utility should be increased by including 
in the construction of the incentive contract, signals of agent effort that improve the 
estimate of this effort. Since monitoring is costly, this may not be the case; the cost of 
monitoring may out weigh the additional value created by the improved precision of 
measurement. 
The use of monitoring and incentive contracts can reduce the costs associated 
with moral hazard in the principal-agent relationship. A number of factors including the 
following will determine the exact mix of monitoring and incentive intensity:7 The cost 
and effectiveness of monitoring technologies; the cost of the agent’s effort; the impact of 
the agent’s effort on the project’s payout, and the impact of exogenous events on the 
outcome of the project. My research examines the importance of each of these factors on 
the principal’s choice on the level of incentive and monitoring intensity. 
When a principal monitors an agent’s effort, monitoring can lead to either the 
redistribution of wealth, changes in the agent’s effort levels, or liquidation of the project 
[see Barry et al., (1990) and Gorman and Sahlman (1989) for a discussion of the role of 
                                                 
6 I will demonstrate the existence of inefficient solutions in chapter 5. 
7 Within the context of the model developed in my research, a contract will have a greater incentive 
intensity than a second contract if an agent receives a higher expected payment from the first contract when 
his effort level produces the highest expected payoffs for the principal. 
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monitoring in venture capital investments].8 Since the principal will only implement 
monitoring if it is in his best interests, a question remains as to whether the agent is 
indifferent or adverse to the use of monitoring by the principal. For example, Barney et 
al., (1996) and Fried and Hirsch (1994), have shown that entrepreneurs will sometimes 
value the monitoring role and non-financial advice supplied by venture capitalists.9 My 
research will show that monitoring will never induce the agent to reduce effort levels, 
however, when monitoring induces the agent to increase effort, in some circumstances, 
dependent on the parameters of the project, some of the increased payoff from the project 
is allocated to the agent. In these cases, even after accounting for the cost of the 
additional effort, the agent will improve his share of wealth and extract rents from the 
project.10 This result is reliant on the non-binding of the reservation constraint. 
Prior research of the principal-agent relationship usually introduces a reservation 
constraint assumption [See Grossman and Hart (1983), Holmstrom (1979), or Ross 
(1973)]. A reservation constraint establishes a baseline level of expected utility that the 
agent can receive if he decides to forego the offered contract and seek employment 
elsewhere in the economy. When this constraint binds,11 the agent extracts no rent from 
the project. This leads to considerable restrictions on the benefits of monitoring since, if 
the agent does not extract rent, monitoring cannot reduce the expected utility of the agent, 
and thus, monitoring can only change the actions of the agent. The introduction of limited 
                                                 
8 Harris and Raviv (1979) show that monitoring is never an optimal strategy when the agent is risk neutral. 
The results herein demonstrate that this result no longer holds when limited liability is introduced into the 
model. 
9 Of course, venture capitalists will often replace CEOs of new ventures should results of monitoring 
suggest this is the optimal strategy. It is unlikely that the entrepreneur would appreciate this form of 
involvement [Lerner (1995)]. 
10 Rent in this context represents the utility in excess of the minimum utility available to the agent through 
seeking alternative employment in the labor market. 




liability in the models developed herein lead to outcomes where the reservation constraint 
does not bind and thus, redistribution of wealth is a possibility. 
The two-period model introduced in this paper allows the principal to monitor 
during the first period, receiving the results of this monitoring before the second period 
begins. In the following research, monitoring provides a signal of effort, which the 
principal uses as a factor to compensate the agent. However, the principal could use the 
results of monitoring as a basis for liquidating the project if assessments of future success 
deem this an optimal strategy.12 In the models developed in my research, liquidation will 
not be allowed as a strategy for the principal since, given a sufficiently high level of 
liquidation receipts, the payoff from any project can be improved by liquidation. Thus, 
any model introducing monitoring and liquidation is acutely dependent on the level of 
liquidation proceeds, which can be set to dominate any of the other models investigated. 
In addition, allowing for liquidation complicates the results of the model while obscuring 
the intricacies of the effects of monitoring. Finally, there are sufficient results from the 
models without liquidation to contribute to the investigation of the relationship between 
principal and agent. 
The designs of the models presented in my research make several unique 
contributions to the extant literature. First, it allows for the construction of contracts that 
can be analyzed directly rather than resorting to comparative static analysis.13 These 
constructions use a simplified model to tackle the issues studied by Demougin and Fluet 
                                                 
12 The liquidation strategy would be optimal if the liquidation proceeds exceeded the expected payoffs from 
continuation of the project. Analysis of the use of monitoring to make decisions on abandoning projects in 
venture-capital investments can be found in Gompers (1995). 
13 When solving the maximization problem, it is common for first-order conditions not to yield explicit 
solutions to the principal-agent problem. To study the impact of model parameters on the implicit solutions 
it then becomes necessary to resort to comparative-static techniques. My models produce explicit 
contractual solutions, which allow for direct investigation. 
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(2001). Whereas Demougin and Fluet (2001) use comparative static techniques to 
consider the optimal mix of incentives and monitoring, the solutions in chapters 5 and 6, 
describe contracts directly, and considers the impact of model parameters on the 
principal-agent relationship through their effects on these contracts. Specifically, these 
structures allow for characterization of optimal effort levels for different regions of model 
parameters. In addition, the ranges of parameters that lead to the optimality of monitoring 
strategies can be directly established. Finally, this analysis establishes the range of 
parameters where monitoring is never an optimal strategy. 
Second, it allows for solution using a simplex algorithm applied in an algebraic 
rather than a numerical setting. This approach sidesteps the issues concerning the 
applicability of a first-order approach by applying the value maximization principal 
directly to the principal-agent problem [see Grossman and Hart (1983), Jewitt (1988), 
Mirrlees (1999), and Rogerson (1985) for discussion of the situations where the first-
order approach can be used in the analysis of principal-agent relationships]. 
Third and finally, it allows the principal to share the signals of first-period effort 
generated by monitoring with the agent, at the end of the first period. The implications of 
the last point, sharing of monitoring results at an interim stage on the relationship 
between principal and agent, has not been previously modeled and thus, brings originality 
to my research. When the principal shares monitoring results at an interim stage, the 
following questions can be investigated: Is it beneficial for the principal to share the 
results of monitoring or is it best to keep the agent in the dark? And, if the sharing of 
monitoring results is possible and desirable from the principal’s point of view, what 
 17
 
strategies will the agent employ?14 My research in part 2 finds that it can be beneficial for 
the principal to share this interim monitoring information with the agent since it will shift 
monitoring risk from the agent to the principal.15 This dimension to my analysis will be 
the focus of part 2. 
Since my research explicitly considers the relationship between incentive 
contracts and monitoring it is useful to consider the results in the light of actual principal-
agent relationships that have been the focus of empirical research. The relationship 
between venture capitalist and entrepreneur is of particular interest, since the venture 
capitalist is faced with projects with a significant likelihood of failure,16 and seeks to 
control his investments with incentive contracts and monitoring activities.17 
Entrepreneurs who accept venture capital typically have contracts that have high 
incentive components whose payout is dependent on project success. Furthermore, the 
venture capitalist actively monitors the project and the entrepreneur’s success is strongly 
linked to the success of the project and monitoring results [Sahlman (1990)]. The analysis 
of monitoring in chapter 6 demonstrates precisely these situations: Monitoring activity by 
venture capitalists can lead to greater entrepreneurial effort and increase the expected 
payoff to the entrepreneur. In some cases, the involvement of the principal through 
monitoring activity increases incentive intensity and improves the expected payoffs from 
the project, and increases the expected payoffs for the entrepreneur even after accounting 
for the cost of the additional effort. 
                                                 
14 In the context of this research, the agent’s strategic decision is what level of effort to devote to the 
project. 
15 Monitoring risk refers to the principal receiving an erroneous signal of agent effort. 
16 Shalman 1990 finds the probability of failure in these relationships to be 34.5%. 
17 The venture capitalists will also stage capital infusions but, as noted earlier, this aspect is outside the 
scope of the research presented in this paper. 
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This part of my dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 3 reviews of the 
literature concerning the principal-agent problem with a focus on the role of monitoring. 
In chapter 4, I give a general description of the assumptions of the models and an 
overview of the methodology used to optimize the principal and agent’s strategies. The 
results for the no-monitoring case are considered in chapter 5. In chapter 6, the effects of 
monitoring are considered; in this chapter, communication of monitoring results only 







Analysis of the principal-agent relationship finds its roots in the works of Cheung 
(1969) and Arrow (1970). Cheung succinctly describes the principal-agent problem 
noting that risk can be reduced either by information collection, diversified through 
adequate portfolio selection, or shared through contractual means. Much of the early 
work considered the relationship between manager and worker. For example, Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) consider the roll played by the firm in facilitating monitoring to 
avoid employee shirking. Their results suggest that firms may exist to allow for the 
monitoring of labor supplied by team members who would individually benefit from 
shirking. Stiglitz (1975) considered the principal-agent problem in the context of a 
worker-supervisor relationship within the setting of a firm. Using assumptions regarding 
the form of the optimal contracts, Stgilitz demonstrates the impact of information, 
monitoring cost and worker risk aversion on the structure of these contracts. 
Investigation of the relationship between external investor and manager within the 
principal-agent framework was studied by Jensen and Meckling (1975). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) also considered the impact of agency costs in the firm and consider the 
role of contracting in reducing this cost. 
Ross (1973) elucidated the principal-agent problem in a general setting and 
considered contractual forms that induced the same attitude toward risk for the principal 
and agent thus allowing for contractual solutions to the principal-agent problem. Ross 




outline of the setup is described below since it introduces and describes the assumptions 
that are used in my model. 
In the situation where the payoff from a project x is a random variable, and the 
effort exerted by the agent cannot be observed, the single-period principal-agent model 
with no monitoring can be programmed as follows: 
( )xs
max
E{V(x – s(x))}     subject to 
E{U(a, s(x))} ≥ E{U(a*, s(x))}     for all a* ∈ A,     and 
E{U(a, s(x))} ≥ R     for some real number R 
In this formulation s(x) represents the contract agreed between principal and 
agent. The contract between principal and agent can only depend on attributes that can be 
observed by both principal and agent and is negotiated before commencement of the 
project. In this program, the only observable attribute is the payoff from the project. In 
later chapters of my dissertation, the principal will have the ability to spend resources on 
monitoring and use the signals as to the effort levels of the agent to enhance the contract. 
The choice of action of the agent is selected form some set of possible actions A. 
Once the contract is negotiated between principal and agent the agent chooses an action 
a ∈ A so as to maximize his expected utility. In general, the chosen effort level is not 
observable by the principal, although the principal can choose to spend resources to 
monitor the agent and obtain an estimate of the actual effort exerted; these situations will 
be considered in chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
The principal and agent are both presumed to act to maximize expected utility. 
The utility of the principal is represented by the function V. The principal receives the 
 
profit from the project after making the contractual payment s(x) to the agent. In later 
chapters of my research, any resources devoted to monitoring the actions of the agent will 
also decrease the expected utility of the principal. The utility of the agent is represented 
by the function U. 
The expectations operator in this program is conditioned on the function f(x, a) 
representing the probability distribution of the random payoff x. As can be seen from its 
arguments, the payoff from the project is affected by the action a taken by the agent. To 
apply certain methods to the solution of program various assumptions are made as to the 
form of the probability distribution. From an economic standpoint, it would seem 
reasonable that increased agent effort should improve the payoff of the project in some 
way. At a basic level for a* > a, it is often assumed that Ea*{x} > Ea{x} where the 
subscript refers to the effort level for the probability distribution function. Thus, greater 
effort leads to a higher expected payoff from the project. 
The first constraint in the program is often described as the individual rationality 
constraint since the response by the agent to a particular contract s(x) and a probability 
function f(x, a) will be to choose the level of effort that will maximize his expected 
utility. The second constraint is often described as the participation or reservation 
constraint and represents the effect of a competitive market for the agent’s talents. The 
agent can obtain the level of utility, R, with certainty in the competitive market. 
The three classic papers on monitoring in the principal-agent relationship are 
Harris and Raviv (1978), Holmstrom (1979), and Shavell (1979). These three papers are 
referred to in the literature as the basis for other studies on monitoring. Each of these 
papers describe how the use of imperfect monitoring will increase agent risk. 
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Harris and Raviv (1978) consider conditions under which imperfect monitoring 
maybe optimal in the principal-agent relationship and consider the impact of monitoring 
uncertainty on this relationship. Specifically, they show that imperfect monitoring leads 
to dichotomous contracts; if the monitoring shows that the agent’s actions are acceptable, 
then the agent is rewarded, if not, the agent is dismissed. My research studies the form of 
these contracts in more detail while also allowing monitoring to be costly. 
Holmstrom (1979) studies the impact of external information received on the 
effort exerted by the agent and considers situations in which this additional information 
improves both the principal and agent’s position. In this research, information is assumed 
to be obtained without cost. Holmstrom shows that as long as the information is not 
random, both principal and agent see an increase in value in their relationship. My 
research considers costly monitoring and studies situations in which monitoring does not 
improve the position of the agent. 
Shavell (1979) considers the impact of agent’s risk aversion on the value of 
monitoring in the principal-agent relationship. Shavell proves, in a similar fashion to 
Holmstrom (1979), that as long as the information is not random, both principal and 
agent see an increase in value in their relationship. 
My research in this dissertation extends the work on monitoring described in these 
three papers. My monitoring technologies are costly; this leads to situations where 
monitoring is too expensive to implement. I construct actual contractual forms and 
analyze the impact of the model parameters on incentive and monitoring intensity. I 
explore the impact of monitoring on the principal and agent and describe when 
monitoring effects effort, expected payouts, and the sharing of risk. Finally, in part 2, I 
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allow for sharing of interim monitoring results. This has never before, I believe, been 




METHODOLOGY: MONITORING WITH NO COMMUNICATION 
 
 
A two-period model will be developed to consider the relationship between 
principal and agent. Three variants of this model will be considered. In the first, the 
principal does not monitor the agent and, therefore, the contract between the two parties 
is solely based on the payoff from the project. The second model involves monitoring 
agent effort during period one. In this model, the results of monitoring will not be shared 
with the agent until the end of the project: The signal of agent effort obtained from 
monitoring will be incorporated into the contractual payment from the principal to the 
agent. In the third model, which will be studied in part 2, monitoring will be undertaken 
during the first period and the results of this monitoring will be shared with the agent at 
the end of the first period. This final model allows the agent to modify his actions in 
period two based on the monitoring results from period one. Once again, the signal of 
agent effort will be incorporated into the contractual payment from the principal to the 
agent. Certain structures and parameters are common to all three models and are 
described and defined in this chapter. 
For all three models, it is assumed that the principal has a fully funded project and 
at the commencement of the project and these funds will be sufficient through the end of 
the second period. The principal is risk neutral and maximizes his expected returns.18 The 
return to the principal will consist of the gross payoff from the project less the contractual 
                                                 
18 The assumption that the principal is risk neutral is a common simplification in research on the principal-
agent problem. Risk-neutral principals can be thought of as expected profit maximizers. This treatment can 
be justified through the use by principals of diversification and syndication to reduce risk. For example, 
venture capital funds will syndicate their investments and, therefore, reduce the risk in their investment 




payment to the agent and any resources spent on monitoring. The principal has unlimited 
liability. 
It is assumed that the agent is also risk neutral. The agent will maximize expected 
net returns, which are defined as contractual payments received from the principal less 
the agent’s cost of effort. It is assumed that the agent brings wealth to the project in the 
amount of υ ≥ 0: Any contract agreed with the principal cannot generate losses for the 
agent in any state of the world that exceeds υ. Thus, the agent has limited liability.TP19 PT The 
amount υ can be thought of as the agent’s investment in the project; the principal in 
effect requires the agent to invest his own capital in the project.TP20 PT This assumption will 
lead to incentive contracts being the solution to the principal-agent problem analyzed in 
this dissertation. The outcome is similar to those generated by the assumption of agent’s 
risk aversion: Risk cannot be completely transferred to the agent. In the case of risk 
aversion, transfer of risk requires the principal to compensate the agent. In the case of 
limited liability, complete transfer of risk is not possible since limited liability does not 
allow the agent to absorb unlimited losses, assuming the agent has insufficient wealth. In 
addition, limited liability brings a real world dimension to my model: When an agent 
manages a project, the agent will usually have insufficient capital to finance the project, 
thus the introduction of a principal is a natural result of the agent’s limited liability. It is 
                                                 
TP
19
PT The inclusion of a limited liability constraint is common in research that includes risk neutrality for the 
agent. See Demougin and Fluet (2001), Dmougin and Garvie (1991), Innes (1989) and Sappington (1981) 
for implementations of limited liability with risk-neutrality, and see Sappington (1991) for an illustration of 
why the assumption of limited liability with risk neutrality can generate incentive contracts solutions to the 
principal-agent problem with moral hazard in the same manner as the assumption of risk aversion. 
TP
20
PT The assumption of limited liability introduces a wealth effect into the models investigated. The agent’s 
decisions on effort levels and the contracts negotiated between the two parties will be directly impacted by 
the wealth of the agent. Although this will complicate solutions to models, it will also add another 
dimension to the analysis of the relationship between principal and agent. 
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assumed that the agent does earn a return on the capital invested in the project.TP21 PT This 
assumption will greatly simplify the analysis of the contractual solutions of the models.TP22 PT 
The model evolves over two periods. The two parties agree on a contract at time 
zero; also, the agent decides on the level of effort to exert on the project during period 
one, and the principal decides on the level of monitoring, if any, to use during this 
period.TP23 PT If the principal monitors the agent, the principal can estimate at time one the 
level of effort exerted by the agent during period one. If the results of monitoring are 
shared with the agent at this intermediate stage, then this leads to an expanded choice of 
strategic decisions for the agent since his period-two effort can be conditioned on the 
outcome of the principal’s monitoring results. The project matures at time two and both 
parties receive payments from the project. 
At time zero, the agent has to decide whether to accept the negotiated contract.TP24 PT 
It is assumed that there is a competitive market for the agent's talents and if he does not 
accept the current project, he can receive the equivalent of R at time two in the market.TP25 PT 
There is no cost to the agent in the assessment of the project before he agrees to accept 
the contract. The agent’s strategy is to decide whether to accept the contract, and if he 
                                                 
TP
21
PT The limited liability value, υ, can be defined as a “with return” value, so that the capital invested by the 
agent, say ζ, earns a return of ρ so that υ = (1 + ρ)ζ. 
TP
22
PT It is straightforward to demonstrate that if both parties are risk neutral, then the moral hazard issue can be 
resolved by the principal franchising the project to the agent. In this solution to the principal-agent 
problem, the agent pays a fixed fee to the principal at the outcome of the project. Through this franchising 
mechanism, the agent will bear all of the cost of the effects of moral hazard. This solution does not 
generally exist when the agent has limited liability since, if a low project payout materializes, the agent 
may have insufficient resources to make the franchise payment. Although the franchise contract is 
negotiated ex ante, the payments are made ex post. 
TP
23
PT If the principal does not monitor the agent’s effort during period one, the agent can decide on the level of 
effort in both periods at time zero since no additional information will be available at time one to change 
the agent’s decision. 
TP
24
PT Throughout the analysis herein, the assumption used in most research and described in Sappington 
(1991) will be used: It is assumed, that when the agent is indifferent among strategies, the agent will choose 
the strategy most preferred by the principal. 
TP
25
PT This reservation constraint ensures that the expected return of the agent must meet or exceed R plus 
repayment of the limited liability value, υ. The returns in both cases are net of the cost of effort. 
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does so, the level of effort to devote to the project. Since there are two periods, the agent 
will decide on effort levels in both periods. In the cases where the principal does not 
monitor, or does monitor at time one and does not share the signal of effort with the 
agent, the agent can decide on his effort level in both periods at time zero. In this case, 
there is no new information generated during the project with which the agent can modify 
his effort decisions in period two. If the principal monitors during period one and shares 
the signal of effort with the agent at time one then the agent can decide on the level of 
effort in period two conditioned on this signal. To simplify the analysis it is assumed that 
the agent cannot quit the project at the end of period one and seek alternative 
employment: The contract will contain a penalty that will make alternative employment 
an unacceptable strategy during period two.TP26 PT This means quasi-rent in period two is 
always positive and thus, the agent will never quit the project at time one and, therefore, 
will always take the project to completion.TP27 PT The effort exerted by the agent in each 
period is costly. It is assumed that the cost measured in time two dollars is given by k for 
high effort and zero for low effort. 
The project's payoff will be dependent on the two periods of agent's effort and a 
random element. There are three possible payoffs from the project at the end of period 
two. These are given by τ + V, V, and V – τ, where τ > 0. It is assumed that the agent can 
exert one of two levels of effort in each of the periods, high or low. Thus, there are four 
two-period effort strategies; high-high, high-low, low-high, or low-low. For the project 
                                                 
TP
26
PT In the analysis that follows, this penalty will not explicitly be introduced as it is assumed that the penalty 
is sufficient to ensure that the agent will never quit at time one. 
TP
27
PT Rent is defined as the excess earnings an agent receives from taking a job compared to alternative 
employment. Quasi-rent is the excess earnings an agent makes by not quitting a job. Therefore, if quasi-rent 
is positive the agent will not resign. This assumption will not be explicitly included in my model. 
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payoff purposes, it is assumed that the two choices, high-low or low-high lead to the 
same probability distribution for the project payoffs. 







































Where row one represents high-high effort, row two high-low effort or low-high 
effort, row three low-low effort; column one payoff τ + V, column two payoff V, and 
column three payoff V – τ. It is assumed that q>⅓ which implies that the outcomes with 
the highest probabilities are on the diagonal of the payoff matrix. Therefore, higher effort 
levels result in a greater probability of project success as measured by project payoff. It is 
assumed that both principal and agent are aware of the probability distribution and are 
aware of the effect of agent’s effort on the payoffs from the project before a contract is 
negotiated.TP28 PT 
When the agent exerts low effort in both periods the expected return from the 
project before cost of effort is considered is given by V – (3q – 1)τ/2. This payoff 
increases to V as the agent increases effort from low to high in one of the periods, and 
V + (3q – 1)τ/2 as the agent increases his effort to high in both periods. Therefore in both 
cases, an increase in effort cost of k yields and increase in project payoffs (3q – 1)τ/2. 
                                                 
TP
28
PT Although the probability distribution is known, the realized value of the project’s payoffs will not be 
discovered until the maturity of the project. 
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The ratio (3q – 1)τ/2k will be defined as the return to effort. This ratio measures the extra 
project payoff generated by inducing the agent to increase his effort in one period. 
Within this framework, there are a number of different possibilities for monitoring 




No Monitoring  
Model I 
Monitoring  
No Communication   
 
Model I I  
Communication  Model I I I  
 
Figure 1: Overview of Models Investigated 
 
 
Model I is the baseline model. In this case, the principal does not monitor. The 
contract between the two parties can only be based on the outcome of the project, which 
has three possible payouts. Therefore, the contract negotiated between the agent and 
principal is of the form (σ B1B, σ B2 B, σB3 B). The principal always has the choice to resort to this 
format if the expected payoff from model I to the principal dominates expected payoffs 
from the other models. 
In model II the principal monitors during period one but does not share the 
outcome of the monitoring until completion of the project. Since the principal’s 
monitoring generates a signal of period one effort, this signal is available to supplement 
the project payoff information in the contract structure. There is an implicit assumption 
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that the results of monitoring can be shared with the agent at time two and that the agent 
can verify without cost the results of monitoring. This avoids the problem of the principal 
falsifying the results of monitoring to his benefit. There is an additional assumption that 
the agent cannot change the principal’s estimate of effort by supplying information to 
him without the principal spending more resources on monitoring that new information. 
In this way, the agent cannot supplement the principal’s monitoring results without 
additional cost being incurred by the principal. The contract will be of the form 
(σBH1 B, σ BH2 B, σBH3 B, σ BL1 B, σBL2 B, σ BL3 B) where the suffix H and L refers to the estimate of effort 
discovered by the principal through the monitoring process during period one. In this 
model, because of the lack of communication between the two parties, the agent’s 
available strategies do not change from the no-monitoring model: The agent will still 
have to decide whether to exert high or low effort in the second period without any 
additional information. 
Model III represents situations in which the principal monitors during period one 
and shares the results of the monitoring with the agent at time one. The same assumptions 
hold as with model II: The principal can share the monitoring results with the agent 
without cost and the agent cannot supplement these monitoring results with additional 
information at no cost to the principal. In this case, the agent can modify his second 
period effort based on the results of the monitoring. As with model II, the contract will be 
of the form (σ BH1 B, σBH2 B, σ BH3 B, σBL1 B, σ BL2 B, σ BL3 B) where the suffix H and L refers to the estimate 
of effort discovered during the monitoring process in the first period. In this model, the 
strategies available to the agent have increased in number and sophistication since the 
agent can now condition his second-period effort on the outcome of the first-period 
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monitoring. The question then becomes whether the principal benefits from sharing 
information at an interim stage and thus improving the strategic choices of the agent. 
In the monitoring models II and III, it is assumed that the principal can monitor 
during period one to estimate the agent’s effort level in the first period. The amount of 
monitoring resources spent will be defined as m ∈ [η, M) where M > η > 0. The lower 
level of monitoring η represents a fixed cost of monitoring; this amount must be spent 
before any useful signal of effort can be received. The upper level of monitoring, M is the 
amount necessary to establish with certainty the true effort level. The probability of 
discovering the true effort level will be defined as p(m) where p(M) = 1 > p(η) > ½, 




SOLUTIONS WHERE MONITORING IS NOT AVAILABLE 
 
 
In model I, the principal does not monitor. At time zero, the two parties agree on 
the contract (σB1 B, σB2 B, σ B3B) where σB1 B is paid to the agent if the project payoff is τ + V, σ B2 B if 
the project payoff is V, and σ B3B if the project payoff is V – τ. Due to the limited liability 
restriction, the construction of the contract must ensure that σ B1B, σ B2 B, σB3 B ≥ 0. The agent can 
decide on effort levels for both periods at time zero since the agent does not receive any 
additional information during either period on which to update his decisions. Therefore, 
due to the absence of information generated at time one, and since it is assumed the high-
low and low-high strategies produce the same probabilities of success, the solutions 
arising from these two strategies will be identical: To simplify the following analysis, 
reference to the low-high strategy will be excluded.TP29 PT 
To solve this system first, the contracts that will induce the agent to exert a 
particular level of effort at the minimum of cost to the principal will be established; this 
step is often described as the implementation problem. When the optimal contracts have 
been established that induce high-high, high-low or low-low effort with the highest 
expected payoff to the principal, the payoffs across strategies can be compared and the 
optimal effort levels from the principal’s point of view can be found. 
                                                 
TP
29
PT This simplification will also be applied to the monitoring model where information is not shared at time 
one since in that case, no additional information will be received by the agent during the project. When 
monitoring data is shared in model III this argument will no longer be true since the agent can decide on 
period-two effort at time one and this decision can be dependent on the monitoring information received 
which is dependent on the effort level during period one. 
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First, consider the high-high effort strategy. Suppose it is believed that the 
contract (σB1 B, σ B2B, σ B3 B) will induce this action. Given this contract, the expected payout to 
the agent will be UBHH B ≡ qσ B1B + (1 – q)(σB2B +σ B3 B)/2 – 2k. 
In order for this contract to compel the agent to exert high effort in both periods, 
the expected payoff to the agent must be greater than those generated by the other two 
available agent strategies. Extending the definition above, this will require UBHH B > UBHLB 

























































































































Therefore, the following constraints must be satisfied: 























































































The first constraint ensures that the contract allows the agent to make at least the 
reservation payoff when exerting high effort in both periods and ensures that the wealth 
invested in the project, υ, is repaid. The remaining three constraints ensure that the high-
high strategy dominates both high-low and low-low strategies. The constraint γ1cons is 
included for completeness. There are also three other constraints generated by the limited 
liability restriction: σB1 B, σ B2B, σ B3 B ≥ 0. 
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Given high-high effort and the contract (σB1 B, σ B2B, σ B3B), the expected payoff to the 
principal is defined as VBHH B ≡ V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – qσ B1B – (1 – q)σ B2B/2 – (1 – q)σB3 B/2. 
To find the optimal contract the following program must be solved: 
Maximize VBHH B over values of (σB1 B, σ B2B, σ B3B), subject to 
(A1)     λcons, γ1cons, γ2cons, γ3cons ≥ 0;     and 
(A2)     σB1 B, σ B2B, σ B3 B ≥ 0. 
To solve this program a simplex algorithm will be employed. The three steps 
involved are to establish a starting vertexTP30 PT, evaluate conditions for each constraint to be 
dominant at the starting vertex, and then demonstrate that no connected vertices lead to 
strictly improving payoffs to the principal. The following results are demonstrated for the 
high-high strategy. The equivalent results are given without proof for the high-low and 
low-low strategies since the proofs are essentially identical in methodology. 
Result I: For the high-high strategy, the following contracts are viable since they 
satisfy the constraints (A1) through (A2). 
: 2 k + R+ u
q
, 0, 0> given 0 < k § - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
2 H-1 + qL
and;
: 4 k
-1 + 3 q
, 0, 0> given k ¥ - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL  
Proof I: See appendix A. 
Thus, a set of potential contracts over an exhaustive list of conditions of the 
model parameters has been established that compel the agent to exert high effort in both 
periods and satisfy the limited liability requirement. At the overlap of the two conditions: 
k = -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
,
 
                                                 
TP
30
PT A vertex is a contract where constraints bind and no slack exists in the system in the sense that the 
contract cannot be adapted to increase expect payoff to the principal without violating any constraints. 
 
The contracts are identical. Furthermore, since the principal’s payoff is decreasing 
in payments to the agent, the optimal contract will arise from the binding of some of the 
constraints (A1) or (A2); there will be no slack in the system. 
Next, whether any improvement can be made to the principal’s expected payoff 
by replacing the above contracts by those generated from connected vertices has to be 
considered. In this context, a connected vertex is formed by changing one of the 
constraints at the current vertex by one from the set of constraints (A1) or (A2), restricted 
to those not already binding. Improvement will be defined as strict improvement; it is 
possible to find connected vertices that yield the same payoff, but only the initial vertex 
will be considered as the optimal contract in these cases. This simplification will not 
change the expected payoffs to either party but will simplify notation and the description 
of results. 
The next result is a general result that will hold throughout the remainder of my 
research. If a viable contract is found at the binding of the reservation constraint, then no 
improvement in expected payoffs can be found by adopting a contract defined at a 
connected vertex. 
Result II: If a viable contract is found at the binding of the reservation constraint, 
then no improvement can be made to the expected payoffs to either the principal or the 
agent by using a contract defined at a connected vertex. 
Proof II: See appendix A. 
The proof for the above result is straightforward and relies on the fact that at the 
binding of the reservation constraint the expected payoff to each party is independent of 




contract occurs at the binding of the reservation constraint, this contract is an actual 
contract that satisfies the principal’s desire for the strategy employed by the agent. 
Hence, when we have 
0 < k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
,
 
the contract that induces high-high effort from the agent is given by 
: 2 k + R+ u
q
, 0, 0> .
 
If the reservation constraint does not bind potential improvements in expected 
payoffs caused by using contracts defined at connected vertices need to considered. 
Result III: For the high-high strategy, the following contracts are solutions 
satisfying the constraints (A1) and (A2). 
: 2 k + R+ u
q
, 0, 0> given 0 < k § - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
2 H-1 + qL
and;
: 4 k
-1 + 3 q
, 0, 0> given k ¥ - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL  
Proof III: See appendix A. 
Therefore, the optimal contracts that induce the high-high effort strategy by the 
agent are: 
: 2 k + R+ u
q
, 0, 0> given 0 < k § - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
2 H-1 + qL
and;
: 4 k
-1 + 3 q
, 0, 0> given k ¥ - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL  
In a similar fashion, the optimal contracts inducing high-low and low-low effort 
are given by: 
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For high - low effort :0, k + R+ u
q




-1 + 3 q
, 0> given k ¥ - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q  
For low- low effort :0, 0, R+ u
q
> for allvaluesof k > 0.
 
The optimal contracts are displayed graphically in figure 2. 
Low-low 







H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
B B
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q  
 
Figure 2: Overview of Optimal Contracts in the No Monitoring Case 
 
 
To understand the overlaps of contracts across strategies, consider for example an 
agent involved with a project who has a cost of high effort k such that: 
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q  
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The principal has a choice of inducing high-high, high-low or low-low effort by 
using contracts: 
: 4 k
-1 + 3 q
, 0, 0>, :0, k + R+ u
q




The final solution to the principal-agent problem with no monitoring can be found 
by answering the question: Which of these contracts leads to the greater expected payoff 
to the principal? 
Result IV: The optimal strategies in the no monitoring case are given by the 
following contracts and conditions.TP31 PT 
: 2 k + R+ u
q
, 0, 0> given 0 < k § - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
2 H-1 + qL
and t ¥
2 k




-1 + 3 q
, 0, 0> given
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
§ k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
and t ¥
2 H k H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H1 - 3 qL2
or
k ¥ -




H1 - 3 qL2
HN2L
 
:0, k + R+ u
q
, 0> given - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
2 H-1 + qL
§ k § -




-1 + 3 q
§ t §
2 H k H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL




-1 + 3 q
, 0> given k ¥ - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
and
2 H2 k q - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H1 - 3 qL2
§ t §
4 k q
H1 - 3 qL2
HN4L
 
                                                 
TP
31
PT No monitoring contracts are labeled (N1) through (N5). In later chapters, contracts that arise from 
monitoring but no communication of results will be labeled (M1),…  Similarly, contracts that arise from 
monitoring with communication of results will be labeled (C1),… 
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:0, 0, R+ u
q
> given k > 0 and 0 § t § 2 k
-1 + 3 q
or
k ¥ -




-1 + 3 q
§ t §
2 H2 k q- H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H1 - 3 qL2
HN5L
 
Proof IV: See appendix A. 
5.1 Analysis of Results when Monitoring is not Implemented 


















H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
B B
-









Both of these gridlines are linearly dependent on the reservation payoff R, and the 
limited liability value υ. In addition, the gridlines are strictly increasing functions of q. 
The implication of these relationships is described below. 
In a descriptive way, the regions in figure 3 can be thought of in terms of high, 
moderate and low cost of effort, and high, medium and low spread of payoffs. For 
instance, region 1 describes projects with low cost of high effort and high dispersion. It 
should be remembered that the categorization of spread and cost of effort into these three 
groupings is a relative not an absolute measure. 
For the no-monitoring case, the incentive intensity of the contractual solutions to 
the principal-agent relationship can be investigated. In general, for two contracts, the first 
has greater incentive intensity than the second, if increased effort yields a greater increase 
in payments to the agent from the first contract than from the second contract. Therefore, 
given two contracts, if the contractual payments for a given level of effort eBaB, can be 
described as CB1 B(eBaB) and CB2 B(eBaB), respectively, then for any effort level eBbB > eBaB contract one 
will have greater incentive intensity if CB1 B(eBbB) > CB2 B(eBb B). 
For the discrete models developed in the no-monitoring case, the contractual 
solutions have the forms (C, –υ, –υ), (–υ, C, –υ) or (–υ, –υ, C) where C ≥ –υ. The values 
C will be defined as the incentive component of the contract. If there exists strict 
inequality, C > –υ, then the contract can properly be defined as an incentive contract, 
since the agent will have an incentive to exert effort in the way preferred by the principal. 
The state in which the incentive component is paid will be defined as the principal’s 
preferred state, and the agent’s strategy that yields the greatest likelihood of the preferred 
state occurring will be defined as the agent’s preferred effort level. In this context, for 
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two contracts defined as (CB1 B, –υ, –υ) and (CB2B, –υ, –υ), the first will have greater incentive 
intensity than the second if CB1 B > CB2 B. 
Result V: For the incentive components of the contractual solutions (N1) through 
(N5): 
(i) For all contracts, the incentive components are decreasing functions of the 
probability of success q; 
(ii) for contracts where the reservation constraint binds, the incentive 
components are increasing functions of the reservation payoff R and the limited liability 
value υ; 
(iii) for all contracts with the exception of (N5), the incentive components are 
increasing functions of the cost of high effort k; and 
(iv) for contracts where the reservation constraint does not bind, the incentive 
components are decreasing functions of the limited liability value υ. 
Proof V: See appendix A. 
Result V(i) shows that the higher the uncertainty of project success, as driven by 
exogenous factors, the greater the incentive intensity. Since higher uncertainty reduces 
the likelihood that the principal rewards the agent for exerting the preferred effort level, 
the agent has to receive higher payoffs in the preferred states to compensate. 
In the cases where the reservation constraint binds, the wealth that the agent 
brings to the project – the limited liability value υ – allows the principal to coerce the 
agent into exerting the preferred effort level by taking the amount in the case of 
unsuccessful project outcomes. Since the agent’s expected payoff is at the reservation 
payment level, the incentive component of these contracts has to compensate the agent 
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for this appropriation. Result V(ii) states that the incentive intensity of these contracts 
increases as the level of limited liability increases. This result stands in contrast to the 
cases where the reservation constraint does not bind, since result V(iv) states that the 
limited liability value reduces the incentive intensity. 
The following result extends result V(iii) across contracts that have the same 
preferred effort level. 
Result VI: For contracts (N1) and (N2), and (N3) and (N4), the incentive 
components of the contractual solutions are an increasing function of the cost of high 
effort, k. 
Proof VI: See appendix A. 
In regions 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 in figure 3, the reservation constraint binds, 
therefore, the agent extracts no rent from the project. In regions 2, 3, and 5 in figure 3, the 
agent extracts rent since the expected payoff earned from the contract is greater than the 
reservation payout, R. This situation does not arise due to any scarcity of workers in the 
labor market, but is a direct consequence of the desire by the principal for the agent to 
exert higher effort than could be induced by lower levels of compensation. In models II 
and III, monitoring will be another mechanism available to the principal to ensure the 
agent works at the preferred effort level. 
Region 1 represents projects where the spread of payoffs from the project is high 
and the cost of agent effort is low. This region can be defined in terms of the following 
relationships: 
0 < k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
and t ¥
2 k
-1 + 3 q  
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In this region, the optimal strategy for the principal is to induce the agent to exert 
high effort in the both periods. The incentive contract between the two parties that 
induces this behavior is of the form: 




With this contract, the agent is only compensated if the project yields a high 
payoff; in the other two cases, moderate or low payoffs, the agent loses the limited 
liability value υ – his wealth invested in the project. If the agent exerts high effort in both 
periods, the expected payoff to the agent from this contract is the reservation value R and 
repayment of the limited liability value υ and thus, the agent extracts no rents from his 
employment. 
Projects in region 1 can be though of as “caretaker” type employment. The agent 
is required to be present and needs to exert his effort diligently. If the agent is lax in his 
role, the projects failure may result and this will have an important impact on the 
project’s payoff. An example of this type of employment would be a security role in an 
area protecting expensive resources. The work of the personnel does not require 
extensive training or education and, therefore, the cost of effort is likely to be minor, but 
its completion is vital to the success of the project. 
Since the agent’s cost of high effort at its lowest level in region 1, the agent’s 
responsiveness to incentives is high. Thus, the need for aggressive incentives does not 
arise and, therefore, the incentive intensity in region 1 is low. Furthermore, as the 
probability of success, q, increases, the slope of the boundary defined by 
τ = 2k/(3q – 1) decreases and the value of the other boundary of region 1, defined by 
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k = (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(2(1 – q)) increases. Thus, increasing probability of success leads to 
lower levels of incentive intensity as region 1 expands its range. 
Regions 2 and 3 represent projects where the spread of payoffs from the project is 
high and the cost of agent effort is moderate and high, respectively. These regions are 
defined in terms of the following relationships: 
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
§ k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
and t ¥
2 H k H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H1 - 3 qL2
for region 2, and
k ¥ -




H1 - 3 qL2
for region 3.
 
In these regions, the optimal strategy for the principal is to induce the agent to 
exert high effort both periods. The contract between the two parties that induces this 
behavior is of the form: 
: 4 k
-1 + 3 q
, 0, 0>
 
With this contract, the principal pays the agent incentive component of the 
contract if the project yields a high payoff. In the other two cases, the agent loses the 
limited liability value υ, since this represents the agent’s wealth invested in the project. If 
the agent works at the preferred effort level, his expected payoff from the project will be: 
4 k q
-1 + 3 q  
In these two regions, the expected payoff to the agent from this contract, net of 
the cost of effort, is greater than the reservation value R and repayment of the limited 
liability value υ. Thus, the agent extracts rents from employment in these types of 
projects and incentive intensity is at its highest. 
 
 46
Projects described as region 2 and 3 type projects can be though of as 
“entrepreneurial” type employment for the agent. Since for these projects high levels of 
effort are expensive which could be thought of as paying for the skill and experience of 
the agent. The employee in this type of position can be thought of as anybody who makes 
strategic decisions managing projects or businesses. Since participation in these projects 
is costly to the agent, and since the project payoff is highly dependent on the agent’s 
effort, then the principal needs to offer more than the reservation level of compensation 
to ensure that the project is given the best chance of success. Due to the high level of 
payoff dispersion, τ, it is worthwhile for the principal to reward the agent for high effort. 
Therefore, the incentive intensity is high in these regions. 
Region 4 represents projects where the spread of payoffs from the project is 
moderate and the cost of agent effort is moderate. This region is defined in terms of the 
following relationships: 
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
§ k § -




-1 + 3 q
§ t §
2 H k H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H1 - 3 qL2  
In this region, the optimal strategy for the principal is to induce the agent to exert 
high effort in the first period and low effort in the second period. The contract between 
the two parties that induces this behavior is of the form: 




With this contract, the agent receives the incentive component of the contract if 
the project yields moderate payoffs. In the other two cases, the agent loses the limited 
liability value υ. Given the optimal strategy of the agent, the expected payoff to the agent 
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from this contract, net of the cost of effort, is the reservation value R and repayment of 
the limited liability value υ. Since the cost of effort is moderate in this region, the 
incentive intensity of the agent’s contract is low. 
Region 5 represents projects where the spread of payoffs from the project is 
moderate and the cost of agent effort is high. This region can be defined in terms of the 
following relationships: 
k ¥ -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
and
2 H2 k q- H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H1 - 3 qL2
§ t §
4 k q
H1 - 3 qL2  
In this region, the optimal strategy for the principal is to induce the agent to exert 
high effort in the first period and low effort in the second period. The contract between 
the two parties is of the form: 
:0, 2 k
-1 + 3 q
, 0>
 
With this contract, the principal will pay the agent the incentive component of the 
contract if the project yields moderate payoffs. In the other two cases, the agent loses the 
limited liability value υ. If the agent works at the preferred effort level, then the expected 
payoff to the agent is given by: 
2 k q
-1 + 3 q  
This expected payoff to the agent from this contract, net of the cost of effort, is 
greater than the reservation value R. Thus, the agent extracts rents from employment in 
these types of projects. 
Projects in regions 4 and 5 can be thought of as managerial/supervisor types of 
employment. The moderate spread of project payouts and the relative cost of agent effort 
cannot justify the principal to induce the agent to exert high effort in both periods. For 
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projects in region 5, since the cost of effort is relatively high, the principal has to offer 
more than the reservation level of compensation. 
Regions 6, 7, 8 and 9 represent projects where the spread of payoffs from the 
project is low and the cost of agent effort is low, moderate and high, respectively. These 
regions can be defined in terms of the following relationships: 
k ¥ -




-1 + 3 q
§ t §
2 H2 k q- H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H1 - 3 qL2
for region 6
0 < k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
and 0 § t §
2 k
-1 + 3 q
for region 7
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
§ k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
and 0 § t §
2 k
-1 + 3 q
for region 8, and
k ¥ -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
and 0 § t §
2 k
-1 + 3 q
for region 9
 
In these regions, the optimal strategy for the principal is to induce low effort from 
the agent in the first and second periods. The contract between the two parties that induce 
this behavior is of the form 




With this contract, the agent receives the incentive component of the contract only 
if low payoffs occur. In the other two cases, the agent loses the limited liability value υ. 
If the agent pursues the preferred effort level, the expected payoff to the agent from this 
contract is the reservation value R and incentive intensity is at its lowest level. 
For these types of project, the cost of effort can be at any level. However, because 
the dispersion of the project payoffs is low, high effort is not worth paying for at any 
cost. This type of project can be thought of as a cash-cow type of business: The project 
pays out regular constant cash flows and work by employees does not make any 
significant difference to this payout. Examples could include sales and service of a 
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mature product in a company’s product line. This product will eventually be phased out, 
but due to market saturation, there will be no significant change in cash flow due to 
worker involvement. Another example would be cleaning services in a fully automated 
factory. The facility being cleaned diligently will not have a significant impact on the 
output of the plant.TP32 PT 
As described above, each of the contractual solutions in result IV are incentive 
contracts in the sense that the agent receives the highest payment – the incentive 
component of the contract – when the outcome of the project is as desired by the 
principal. This outcome has the greatest chance of occurring when the agent employs the 
strategy that is optimal from the principal’s point of view – the preferred effort level. For 
the undesired project outcomes, the agent loses the limited liability value. Because of the 
dichotomous nature of these contracts, the contracts can also be described as efficiency 
wages: The agent will exert the required effort because the cost of not doing so is 
prohibitive. 
Next, the impact of moral hazard on the relationship between principal and agent 
can be considered in the context of the no-monitoring case. Suppose no moral-hazard 
concerns existed in the relationship between principal and agentTP33 PT, then the contract 
between principal and agent could be constructed on two parameters; the outcome of the 
project, and the actual effort exerted by the agent. Therefore, the contractual solution, in 
its most general form, will have the following structure, 
{σ BHH1 B, σBHH2 B, σ BHH3 B, σBHL1 B, σ BHL2 B, σ BHL3 B, σ BLL1 B, σ BLL2 B, σ BLL3 B}, where σ BHH1 B is the contractual 
                                                 
TP
32
PT The maintenance of the assembly line would fall within region 1 since the worker involvement, although 
not costly to the worker, would be critical to the success of the project. 
TP
33
PT With no moral hazard, we can assume that the principal can directly observe the level of effort. 
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payment made to the agent if the project yields the highest payoff and the agent exerts 
high effort in both periods,… the other contract elements are similarly defined. 
Solving the associated maximization problem leads to solutions where the agent 
exerts high effort in both periods of the project when τ ≥ 2k/(3q – 1), and low effort in 
both periods when τ ≤ 2k/(3q – 1). In both cases, the reservation constraint binds and the 
agent is rewarded with an expected payment, net of cost of effort, of R + υ, extracting no 
rents from the project. 
Analysis of these results, and comparisons to the results established above in 
model I, can be used to understand the cost to the principal and agent of the moral hazard 
issue. Table 1 shows the change in expected payout, because of the inclusion of moral 
hazard, to each participant in each of the regions described in the no-monitoring case. 
The regions in this table are those described in figure 3. 
 
Table 1: Effects of Moral Hazard 
 Change in expected payment to principal 
Change in expected payment to 
agent 
Region 1 – – 
Regions 2 and 3 –2(1 + q)k/(3q – 1) + R + υ 2(1 + q)k/(3q – 1) – R – υ 
Region 4 –(3q – 1)τ/2 + k – 
Region 5 –(3q – 1)τ/2 + 2(2q – 1)k/(3q – 1)  + R + υ (1 – q)k/(3q – 1) – R – υ 
Region 6 –(3q – 1)τ + 2k – 
Regions 7, 8 and 





The inclusion of an assumption of moral hazard never results in the principal 
being strictly better off and, similarly, the agent is never strictly worse off. Therefore, the 
moral hazard problem works in all cases to the benefit of the agent, allowing him to 
extract rents from the project in regions 2, 3 and 5. This benefit manifests itself in higher 
levels of incentive intensity in regions 2, 3 and 5. 
Furthermore, the inability of the principal to separate the actions of the agent from 
the exogenous effects leads to solutions that are not pareto optimal. Consider projects that 
are described by the interior of region 4. If the agent’s effort level could be discovered 
without cost, a contract could be constructed where the agent is paid the reservation value 
plus the cost of effort, R + υ + 2k, if the agent exerts high effort in both periods, or else 
the agent loses the limited liability value. In this case, the principal’s position will strictly 
improve whereas the agent’s position will remain unchanged. The actual solution in this 
case is an inefficient allocation in the sense that if the principal could directly observe the 
agent’s effort, then there is a total value maximizing allocation that would be strictly 
preferred by the principal and agent: Even with the use of incentive contracts efficiency is 
not achieved. 
Certain observations can also be made about the impact of limited liability on the 
relationship between the principal and agent. Suppose a principal has a project and is 
faced with a choice between two possible agents. Suppose that the cost of effort for both 
agents is identical but the first agent has greater personal wealth to invest in the project. 




Result VII: Given any project, if a principal has a choice between two agents 
with limited liability values υB1B > υB2 B ≥ 0, where the cost of effort for both agents is 
identical, then the second agent with the lower limited liability is never strictly preferred 
by the principal.TP34 PT 
Proof VII: See appendix A. 
This result is possible since wealth effects are introduced into the model presented 
herein through the assumption of limited liability. Agents are differentiated by the 
varying levels of wealth they can bring to projects through the losses they can endure. 
5.2 Solution of the Dual Problem 
Since the solutions to the principal-agent relationship were found using a linear 
programming methodology, there exists a dual problem for the original primal problem. 
The primal problem used to find contractual solutions that induce the entrepreneur to 
exert high effort in both periods was analyzed above and can be described as: 

























































The corresponding dual problem is described by: 
                                                 
TP
34
PT Since the reservation constraint requires the agent to receive expected payments at least at the level R 
plus repayment of the limited liability value υ, then the first agent has a tighter reservation constraint. 
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Thus, the dual problem used to find contractual solutions that induce the 
entrepreneur to exert high effort in both periods is given by: 




H1 - 3 qL l2 +
1
2
H1 - 3 qL l3 ¥ -q  
1
2
H-1 + qL l1 +
1
2





H-1 + qL l1 +
1
2





λ B1B, λ B2 B, λ B3B ≥ 0. 
The solution of dual problem in each case confirms the results of the primal 
problem analysis and describes shadow prices for the constraints described in the primal 
problems. In regions 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 where the reservation constraint was found to 
bind, the shadow prices for k and R + υ is 1. In other words, market conditions lead to a 
reduction in the cost of high effort, reservation payment, or level of limited liability then 
this will lead to a corresponding increase in the expected payoff to the principal. 
In the remaining regions, the shadow price for R + υ is always zero. This is not 
surprising since the reservation constraint does not bind in these regions. In addition, the 
shadow price for the agent’s cost of effort k is: 
2 q
-1 + 3 q  
 
Thus, a reduction in the agent’s cost of effort improves the expected payoff to the 






SOLUTIONS WHERE MONITORING IS AVAILABLE BUT 
INFORMATION IS NOT SHARED 
 
 
If the principal monitors the agent’s effort during period one, the incentive 
contract between the two parties can be constructed to include the results of the 
monitoring activity. At time zero, the two parties agree on the contract 
(σBH1 B, σ BH2 B, σBH3 B, σ BL1 B, σBL2 B, σ BL3 B), where σ BH1 B is paid to the agent if monitoring generates a 
signal of first period effort being high and the project payoff is τ + V, σ BH2 B if monitoring 
generates a signal of first period effort being high and the project payoff is V, and so on. 
Due to the limited liability restriction, the structure of the contract must ensure that 
σ BH1 B, σBH2 B, σ BH3 B, σBL1 B, σ BL2 B, σ BL3 B ≥ 0.  Since the new information generated at time one is not 
shared with the agent, the agent’s strategy on both period’s effort levels can be 
considered to be made at time zero. 
To solve this system, the contracts that induce a particular strategy from the agent 
at the minimum of cost to the principal, given a fixed level of monitoring resources m, 
are established. When the contracts that induce high-high, high-low or low-low effort at 
the highest payoff to the principal have been constructed, the payoffs across strategies 
can be compared. As will be seen, for any project given a cost of effort, k, and a level of 
project payoff spread, τ, either a single contract and monitoring strategy will dominate, or 
multiple contracts and monitoring strategies will dominate and the single optimal solution 
will be dependent on the form of monitoring function. 
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First, consider the principal’s strategy that induces high effort in both periods. 
Suppose it is believed that the contract (σBH1 B, σBH2 B, σ BH3 B, σBL1 B, σ BL2 B, σ BL3 B) will induce this 
action. Given this contract, and a level of monitoring resources m, the expected payout to 
the agent will be: 
UHH ª -2 k + p qsH1 + H1 - pL qsL1 +
1
2
H1 - qL Hp HsH2 + sH3L + H1 - pL HsL2 + sL3LL  
In order for this contract to compel the agent to exert high effort in both periods, 
the expected payoff to the agent must be greater than those generated by the other two 
available agent strategies. Extending the definition above, this will require UBHH B > UBHLB, 
UBHH B > UBLHB and UBHH B > UBLLB where: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )























































































In order for the contract and level of monitoring to induce high effort in both 
periods, the payout matrix and the reservation utility must conform to the following 
constraints: 
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The first constraint ensures that the contract allows the agent to make at least the 
reservation payoff when exerting high effort in both periods, and receives back the wealth 
invested in the project. The remaining four constraints ensure that the high-high strategy 
dominates over both high-low, low-high and low-low strategies. The constraint γ1cons is 
included for completeness. There are also six other constraints generated by the limited 
liability restriction σBH1 B, σ BH2 B, σBH3 B, σ BL1 B, σBL2 B, σ BL3 B ≥ 0. 
Given high effort in both periods and the contract (σBH1B, σ BH2 B, σ BH3 B, σBL1 B, σ BL2 B, σBL3 B) the 
expected payoff to the principal is: 
VHH ª -m+ V+
1
2
H-1 + 3 qL t - p qsH1 +
1
2
p H-1 + qL HsH2 + sH3L
+H-1 + pL qsL1 -
1
2
H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsL2 - sL3L
 
To find the optimal contract we have the following program: 
Maximize VBHH B over values of (σBH1 B, σ BH2 B, σ BH3B, σ BL1 B, σ BL2 B, σBL3 B), subject to: 
(A1)     λcons, γ1cons, γ2cons, γ3cons, γ4cons ≥ 0;     and 
(A2)     σBH1 B, σ BH2 B, σBH3 B, σ BL1 B, σBL2 B, σ BL3 B ≥ 0. 
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The method for finding the optimal contract for each level of monitoring 
resources, m, is similar to the methods used in the no monitoring case. 
Result VIII: For the high-high strategy, the following contracts satisfy the 
constraints (A1) and (A2). 
: 2 k + R+ u
p q
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0> given 0 < k § - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL












H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL




§ q < 1 and k > -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL




H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR + uL





p H-1 + 3 qL





, k ¥ -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + 2 qL
and
-1 + q
-3 + 5 q
§ p < 1
 
: 4 k
-1 + p + q+ p q





, k > -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL


















H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL




§ q < 1 and k > -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL







H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL





Where the monitoring function p is evaluated at the optimal level of monitoring 
resources given the monitoring function forms.TP35 PT 
Proof VIII: See appendix A. 
                                                 
TP
35
PT The optimization program finds the optimal strategy for any given level of monitoring resources, 
m ∈ [η, M). The final stage is to find the level of monitoring, m*, that maximizes the expected payoff to 
the principal across these optimal strategies. Later in this chapter, forms of monitoring functions will be 
introduced and the level of optimal monitoring will be found for these classes of functions. This will 
demonstrate that the process of optimization is viable. 
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So far, the contracts that induce the agent to exert high effort in both periods 
along with the parameter values that ensure the constraints (A1) and (A2) are satisfied 
have been found. For these contracts to be solutions to the optimization problem set out 
above, two further attributes need to be considered. First, do these parameter values span 
the entire parameter space, and second, can the expected payoff to the principal be 
improved by using contracts described at connected vertices.TP36 PT 
Result IX: The parameter values that ensure the constraints (A1) and (A2) are 
satisfied for the three contracts span the entire parameter space. 
Proof IX: See appendix A. 
Result X: For the three contracts established in result VIII, the expected payoff to 
the principal cannot be improved by using contracts found at connected vertices. 
Proof X: See appendix A. 
Therefore, the optimal contracts that induce high-high strategy from the agent are: 
: 2 k + R+ u
p q
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0> given 0 < k § - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL












H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL




§ q < 1 and k > -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL




H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR + uL





p H-1 + 3 qL





, k ¥ -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + 2 qL
and
-1 + q
-3 + 5 q
§ p < 1
 
                                                 
TP
36




-1 + p + q+ p q





, k > -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL


















H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL




§ q < 1 and k > -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL







H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL





In a similar fashion, the following optimal contracts induce high-low, low-high 
and low-low effort in the first and second periods, respectively: 
For high-low effort: 
:0, k + R+ u
p q




H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
and
H-1 + qL Hk + R+ uL
k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR+ uL
§ p < 1
 
:0, 2 k
-1 + p + q + p q






H-1 + qL Hk + R+ uL
k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR+ uL  
For low-high effort: 
:0, 0, 0, 0, k + R+ u
p q
, 0> given 0 < k § - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
-1 + q  
:0, 0, 0, 0, 2 k
p H-1 + 3 qL
, 0> given k > - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q  
For low-low effort: 






For each of the effort strategies above, the regions of dominance span the 
complete parameter spaces. The following result shows that the low-high effort strategies 
can be discarded. 
Result XI: The low-high effort strategies are redundant since the expected payoff 
from the high-low effort strategies is identical. 
Proof XI: See appendix A. 
Result XII: The contracts that maximize the expected payout to the principal in 
the monitoring without communication model are equations (M1) through (M6) below; 
the corresponding parameter values are included in appendix B: 
: 2 k + R+ u
p q
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0> HM1L
: 2 k
p H-1 + 3 qL
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0> HM2L
: 4 k
-1 + p + q+ p q
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0> HM3L
:0, k + R+ u
p q
, 0, 0, 0, 0> HM4L
:0, 2 k
-1 + p + q + p q
, 0, 0, 0, 0> HM5L




Proof XII: See appendix A. 
In the analysis that follows, the level of monitoring intensity will be considered 
for each contractual solution. For any probability function p(m), a level of monitoring, 
p(mB1 B) will be described as strictly more intense than a second level of monitoring p(mB2 B) if 
p(mB1 B) > p(mB2 B). 
Before comparing the contractual solutions in result XII to the no-monitoring 
contracts, it is worth considering how the parameter values associated with these 
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solutions compare to the parameter values of the solutions in the no-monitoring case. 
This comparison is set out in table 2. The column headers for the table are described as 
follows: “High and High with Reservation” refers to contracts where the agent exerts 
high effort in both periods and the reservation constraint binds. The other headers are 
described in a similar manner. The regions in this table are described in figure 3. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Regions of Influence of Monitoring Contracts 
 High and High with 
Reservation 
High and High with 
No Reservation 
High and Low with 
Reservation 
High and Low with 
No Reservation 
Low and Low with 
Reservation 
Region 1       XXX
Region 2       XXX XXX
Region 3       XXX XXX
Region 4       XXX XXX XXX
Region 5       XXX XXX XXX XXX
Region 6       XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX
Region 7       XXX
Region 8       XXX
Region 9       XXX
 
6.1 Comparison of Monitoring Contracts to No Monitoring Contracts 
In this section, comparison of monitoring verses no monitoring strategies are 
made and the circumstances where monitoring is the optimal strategy for the principal is 
formulated. Firstly, monitoring may induce the agent to exert higher effort. This could 
lead to higher expected payoffs to the principal only, or to both the principal and agent. In 
addition, there is a possibility that the principal’s position will improve due to this 
increase in effort but the agent’s position may actually worsen as measured by expected 
payoff due to the cost of this higher effort. 
Increase in effort is only possible in regions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. In any of these 
regions, improvement in the expected payoff to the agent is possible. Only in region 5 is 
there potential for reduction in the expected payoff to the agent since in this region, the 
agent is extracting rents from the project and there is potential for monitoring to induce 
the agent to exert higher effort but reduce his expected payoff to the reservation value. 
Secondly, monitoring may not result in any change in effort but there could be a 
shift in expected payoff from the agent to the principal. This outcome is possible in 
regions 2, 3, and 5 since the agent is receiving expected payoffs in excess of the 
reservation payment and thus, monitoring may reduce the agent’s rent. 
Thirdly, monitoring may induce the agent to exert lower effort but, due to a shift 
in expected payoff to the benefit of the principal, the principal prefers this strategy. This 
set of circumstances is a possibility in regions 2, 3, and 5, since the agent is receiving 
expected payoffs in excess of the reservation payment and the agent is exerting effort 
above the lowest level possible. 
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Finally, for certain projects monitoring may not be the optimal strategy. The 
following two results demonstrate the existence of projects where monitoring will leave 
effort levels unchanged and where the expected payoff to the agent remains at the 
reservation level. Since there is no improvement in expected payoffs from the project and 
since there can be no shifting of resources from the agent to the principal, monitoring will 
not be an optimal strategy for these projects. 
Result XIII: In region 1, monitoring is never the optimal strategy for the 
principal. 
Proof XIII: See appendix A. 
In the no-monitoring case, region 1 was described as “caretaker” employment. 
Since the cost of effort is relatively cheap and the spread of project payouts is relatively 
high, the principal can motivate the agent by contractual means to exert high effort in 
both periods. There are sufficient payoffs from a successful project to compensate the 
agent for his cheap devotion to duty. Monitoring can produce the same results but is not 
the optimal method when compared to contractual means. 
This illustrates the concepts of the monitoring intensity principle which states that 
as incentive intensity37 increase so should the level of monitoring intensity: If an agent’s 
compensation is sensitive to the level of effort he applies, then it is prudent to measure 
this effort level accurately. It was established in chapter 5, for region 1 type contractual 
solutions, incentive intensity is at a low level. Therefore, monitoring the agent’s effort 
during the first period is not an optimal strategy for the principal. 
A similar result holds in regions 7, 8 and 9. 
                                                 




Result XIV: In regions 7, 8 and 9, monitoring is never the optimal strategy for the 
principal. 
Proof XIV: See appendix A. 
In the no-monitoring case, projects in regions 7, 8, and 9 were described as 
“unskilled” employment. In these regions, the dispersion of project payout is sufficiently 
low that agent effort is not worth encouraging. Since this can be achieved by incentive 
contracts, and since the agent need only be compensated at the reservation level, then 
monitoring is never the optimal strategy in these regions. 
Analysis of the results below will show that regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 are the only 
regions where monitoring is never the optimal strategy.38 Thus, if for some exogenous 
reason, the principal is forced to monitor projects that can be described as residing in 
these regions, then monitoring resources will be devoted to the project at the minimum 
level required by the exogenous factors driving the monitoring requirement. Since in 
these regions the agent is receiving the reservation payment, the monitoring cost arising 
from the exogenously required monitoring will fall entirely on the principal.39
The following result shows that projects do not exist where monitoring would 
leave effort levels unchanged, but expected payoff to the agent would increase from the 
reservation level to a non-reservation level. If these situations did exist, then monitoring 
would lead to a decrease in expected payoff to the principal. 
                                                 
38 Monitoring may not be the optimal strategy in other regions but this will arise due to the effectiveness of 
the monitoring technologies available to the principal. 
39 See Walker (2000) for a discussion of the harm caused to the relationship between contractors and local 





Result XV: There do not exist projects where monitoring would lead to no 
change in effort levels, but would lead to an increase in expected payoffs to the agent 
from the reservation to a non-reservation level. 
Proof XV: See appendix A. 
The proof of this result relies on the parameter conditions for the contractual 
solutions under scrutiny being empty. It should be noted that even if the intersection of 
the conditions in result XV were not empty, monitoring would still not be preferred since 
the principal would not waste resources monitoring if the only outcome would be to 
increase the expected payoff of the agent while holding the effort level constant. 
The following result illustrates situations in which monitoring does not induce 
any change in effort but there is a shift in expected payoff from the agent to the principal. 
In the following case, the use of monitoring reduces the agent’s expected payoff to the 
level of the reservation payment and thus, the ability of the agent to extract rents from 
employment are removed. 
Result XVI: For contracts (N2) and (N4) there exists monitoring functions that 
leave the level of effort from the agent unchanged, but this monitoring activity results in a 
reduction in expected payments to the agent from a non-reservation to a reservation 
value. 
For contract (N2), this can occur only in a subset of the contract’s conditions 
given by: 
{1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k ≥ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) ≤ k 
    ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)]} and 
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  τ ≥ 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P or 
(3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] ≤ k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) and 
  τ ≥ [2k(1 + q) – 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P. 
For contract (N4), this can occur only in a subset of the contract’s conditions 
given by: 
(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) and 
 2[kq – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P ≤ τ ≤ 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1)P2P. 
For contract (N2), in the subset of conditions, the monitoring functions that 
achieve this outcome have the following forms: 
p(m*) ≥ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)] 
 for     m* ≤ 2(1 – q)k/(3q – 1) – R – υ. 
For contract (N4), in the subset of conditions, the monitoring functions that 
achieve this outcome have the following forms: 
H1- qL H2k + R + uL
k H1 - qL + H1+ qL HR + uL
§
p §
H1- qL H-1+ 3q + 2 Hk+ R + uLL








In both cases, monitoring activity yields the same overall expected payoff to the 
principal and agent considered in total before monitoring cost, and is an optimal strategy 
for principal due to transfer of wealth from the agent to the principal. 
Proof XVI: See appendix A. 
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For contracts (N2) and (M1), the principal induces the agent to exert high effort in 
both periods. With monitoring, however, the cost of monitoring reduces the overall 
payoff from the project from V – 2k + (3q – 1)τ/2 to V – 2k + (3q – 1)τ/2 – m. 
Due to this monitoring activity, the expected payoff from the project to the agent 
declines from 2k(1 – q)/(3q – 1) – υ to R + υ. 
The contract that induces this effort from the agent in concert with monitoring is 
given by {(2k + R + υ)/(pq) – υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ}. With this contract, the principal 
pays the agent the incentive component of this contract if the high project payoff occurs 
and the results from the monitoring are a signal that the agent expended high effort in the 
first period. In the other five cases, the agent loses the limited liability value υ. 
This contract is comparable to the non-monitoring contract that induces high 
effort in both periods, and which leads to the binding of the reservation constraint. This 
contract, as discussed in chapter 5, has the form {(2k + R + υ)/q – υ, –υ, –υ}. 
When comparing the incentive components of each contract, 
(2k + R + υ)/(pq) – υ and (2k + R + υ)/q – υ, the incentive component from the agent’s 
point of view has been improved on over the comparable incentive component in the no-
monitoring case. As the monitoring intensity principle dictates, incentive intensity 
increases when monitoring is a preferred strategy. This comes at the expense of receiving 
the higher payout with less frequency. In a sense, monitoring has extended region 1 to 
include areas of region 2 at the agent’s expense. 
The expected payoff to the principal, because of this monitoring activity, is given 
by V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – R – 2k – m. Thus, the expected payoff is not dependent on the 
probability of discovering the true level of effort, p. In this situation, monitoring is 
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optimal if the probability of discovering the true effort level in period one is greater or 
equal (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)]. 
Since the expected payoff to the principal is declining as the level of monitoring 
resources increases, then the principal will only expend sufficient monitoring resources 
such that p(m*) = (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)]. 
The boundary condition in this expression is an increasing function in the agent 
cost of effort and a decreasing function of the probability of project success and limited 
liability. Thus, monitoring intensity will increase for projects with low likelihood of 
success or for agents with high cost of effort or low levels of limited liability. 
For an example of a group of monitoring functions that satisfies these conditions, 
consider monitoring functions of the form p(m) = am + b. In general, for a linear function 
to satisfy the conditions above, it is required that: 
0 < a < 1/[2(M – η)]     and     1/2 – aη < b < 1 – aM. 
In region 2, if we have M < 2k(1 – q)/(3q – 1) – (R + υ), then the following 
conditions for a and b yield linear monitoring functions that result in monitoring being 
the optimal strategy in region 2: 
a < [2k(1 – q) – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/{2[2k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)](M – η)}     and 
 (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)]/[2k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)] – aM ≤ b 
 ≤ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)]/[2k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)] – aη. 
This group of linear functions is not an exhaustive collection of linear monitoring 
functions in region 2 that lead to monitoring being the optimal strategy but, simply an 
example of classes of such functions. For this group, the optimal level of monitoring is 
given by m* = (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)]/{a[2k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)]} – b/a. 
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Result XVII: For contracts (N2) and (N4), there exists monitoring functions that 
leave the level of effort from the agent unchanged, but this monitoring activity results in a 
reduction in the agent’s expected payoff but not to the level of the reservation payment. 
For contract (N2) this can occur only in subsets of the contract’s conditions given 
by: 
1/3 < q < 1/2, k ≥ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], and τ ≥ 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P, or (X1) 
(3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] ≤ k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) and 
 τ ≥ [2k(1 + q) – 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
{1/3 < q < 1/2 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) ≤ k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)} and τ ≥ 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P, or (X2) 
1/3 < q < 1/2, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], and τ ≥ 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P. (X3) 
For contract (N4) this can occur only in subsets of the contract’s conditions given 
by: 
(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k < 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) and 
 2[qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P ≤ τ ≤ 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1)P2P, or (X4) 
(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k < 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) and 
2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ < 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
1/3 < q < 1/2, 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) ≤ k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(2q – 1), and 
 2[qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P ≤ τ < 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P. (X5) 
For contract (N2), in the subset of conditions, the monitoring functions that 
achieve this outcome have the following forms: 
p(m*) ≥ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q), m* ≤ 2qk/(3q – 1) for (X1), 
p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)], 
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 m* ≤ 4q(1 – q)(2p – 1)/[(3q – 1)(q + p + qp – 1) for (X2), or 
p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q), m* ≤ 4q(1 – q)(2p – 1)/[(3q – 1)(q + p + qp – 1) for (X3). 
For contract (N4), in the subset of conditions, the monitoring functions that 
achieve this outcome have the following forms: 
p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)(k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + k(1 – q)], 
m* ≤ 2q(1 – q)(2p – 1)/[(3q – 1)(q + p + qp – 1) for (X4), or 
p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)(3q – 1)τ/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk], 
 m* ≤ 2q(1 – q)(2p – 1)/[(3q – 1)(q + p + qp – 1) for (X5). 
In both cases, monitoring activity yields the same overall expected payoff to the 
principal and agent considered in total before monitoring cost, and is an optimal strategy 
for principal due to transfer of wealth from the agent to the principal. 
Proof XVII: See appendix A. 
As an illustration of monitoring functions that fulfill these conditions, consider 
(X1). In this region, both the monitoring and non-monitoring contracts induce high effort 
in both periods. With monitoring, however, the overall payoff from the project is reduced 
by the cost of monitoring from V – 2k + (3q – 1)τ/2 to V – 2k + (3q – 1)τ/2 – m. Due to 
monitoring, the expected payoff to the agent declines from 2k(1 – q)/(3q – 1) – υ to 
2k(1 – 2q)/(3q – 1) – υ. 
This represents a loss in expected payoff of 2kq/(3q – 1). The expected payoffs to 
the principal and agent if monitoring is undertaken are: 
2kq/(3q – 1) + V + (3q – 1)τ/2 + υ – m and 2k(1 – 2q)/(3q – 1) – υ, respectively. 
The contract that induces this effort from the agent in concert with monitoring is 
given by {2k/[p(3q – 1)], –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ}. With this contract, the agent receives the 
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incentive component if high payoffs occur and the results from the monitoring are a 
signal that the agent expended high effort in the first period. In the other five cases, the 
agent loses the limited liability value υ. 
Notice that in this region, monitoring is optimal if the probability of discovering 
the true effort level in period one is greater or equal to (1 – q)/(3 – 5q). Since the 
expected payoff to the principal is declining as the level of monitoring resources 
increases, the principal will only expend sufficient monitoring resources such that 
p(m*) = (1 – q)/(3 – 5q). 
As an example of a group of monitoring function that satisfies these conditions, 
consider the monitoring function of the form p(m) = am + b. In general, for a linear 
function to satisfy the conditions for monitoring functions it is required that: 
0 < a < 1/[2(M – η)]     and     1/2 – aη < b < 1 – aM. 
In this sub region if the parameter conditions are such that the following is true, 
1/3 < q < 5/11 and M < 2k(1 – q)/(3q – 1) – (R + υ), then the following conditions for a 
and b yield linear monitoring functions that provide for monitoring being the optimal 
strategy in region 2: 
(3q – 1)/[2(3 – 5q)(M – η)] < a < [2(1 – 2q)]/[(3 – 5q)(M – η)]     and 
b < (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) – aη. 
This group of linear functions is not an exhaustive collection of linear monitoring 
functions in this sub region of region 3 that lead to monitoring being the optimal strategy. 
For this group, the optimal level of monitoring is given by m* = (1 – q)/[(3 – 5q)a] – b/a. 
The previous results illustrate situations where the optimal level of monitoring is 
found at the boundary of the regions. This does not need to be the case. For (X2) and 
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(X3), the expected payoff to the principal, if monitoring is undertaken, is given by 
V + (3q – 1)τ/2 + υ – m – 4kpq/(pq + q + p – 1). 
For (X4) and (X5), the expected payoff to the principal if monitoring is 
undertaken is given by V + υ – m – 2kpq/(pq + q + p – 1). 
In these regions, the expected payoff to the principal is dependent on the level of 
monitoring resources spent directly, and indirectly through the probability of discovering 
the true level of effort due to the monitoring activity. The two terms that are impacted by 
the level of monitoring resources in the principal’s expected payoff are m and 
4kpq/(pq + q + p – 1) for the first, and 2kpq/(pq + q + p – 1) for the second. The 
derivative of the second term in each case with respect to m is given by, 
4k(1 – q)qp′/(pq + q + p – 1) P2P and 2k(1 – q)qp′/(pq + q + p – 1) P2P, respectively, where p′ is 
the derivative of p with respect to m. Since p is assumed to be a strictly increasing 
function of m, the second term is strictly increasing in m. Therefore, dependent on the 
form of the monitoring function, interior solutions to the principal’s optimization problem 
may exist in these regions. 
The next set of results consider situations in which monitoring induces the agent 
to exert higher levels of effort. The first result demonstrates increased exertion of effort 
but expected payments to the agent staying at the reservation level. Since these payoffs 
take into account the cost of the additional effort, the agent sees no net change in his 
expected payoffs even though he expends more effort. 
Result XVIII: For contracts (N3) and (N5), there exists monitoring functions that 
induce the agent to exert a higher level of effort, but this monitoring activity results in the 
agent’s expected payoff remaining at the reservation payment level. 
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For contract (N3), this can occur only in subsets of the contract’s conditions given 
by: 
(3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) and 
 2k/(3q – 1) < τ ≤ 2[(1 + q)k – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P. (XI1) 
For contract (N5), this can occur only in subsets of the contract’s conditions given 
by: 
{1/3 < q < 1/2 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
 2k/(3q – 1) < τ ≤ 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, or (XI2) 
1/3 < q < 1/2, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], and 
 2k/(3q – 1) < τ ≤ 2[(1 – q)k – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, or (XI3) 
{1/3 < q ≤ 3/7 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 3/7 < q < 1 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2k/(3q – 1) < τ ≤ 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
{1/3 < q < 1/2 and 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k ≥ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2k/(3q – 1) < τ ≤ 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), or 
{1/3 < q < 3/7 and 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), or 
 3/7 ≤ q < 1/2 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] < k < (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q)}, and 
  2[(1 – q)k – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P < τ ≤ 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), or 
1/3 < q < 3/7, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] < k < 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
2[(1 – q)k – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P < τ ≤ 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P.(XI4) 
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For contract (N3), in the subset of conditions, the monitoring functions that 
achieve this outcome have the following forms: 
p(m*) ≥ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)], 
m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ/2 – k for (XI1). 
For contract (N5), in the subset of conditions, the monitoring functions that 
achieve this outcome have the following forms: 
p(m*) ≥ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)], 
m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ – 2k for (XI2), 
p(m*) ≥ (1 – q)(k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)], 
m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ/2 – k for (XI3), or 
(1 – q)(k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)] ≤ 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)[2(k + R + υ) + (3q – 1)τ]/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ 
   + 2(3q – 1)k + 2(1 + q)(R + υ)], 
  m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ/2 – k for (XI4). 
Proof XVIII: See appendix A. 
The next result demonstrates increased exertion of effort by the agent but 
expected payments to the agent decrease from a non-reservation to a reservation level. 
Therefore, adoption of monitoring by the principal encourages the agent to exert greater 
effort and allocates the payoff from the project away from the agent to the principal. 
Result XIX: For contract (N4), there exists monitoring functions that induce the 
agent to exert a higher level of effort, and this monitoring activity results in the agent’s 
expected payoff decreasing from a non-reservation to a reservation payment level. 
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For contract (N4), this can occur only in subsets of the contract’s conditions given 
by: 
{1/3 < q < 1/2 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ ≤ 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P. 
For contract (N4), in the subset of conditions, the monitoring functions that 
achieve this outcome have the following forms: 
p(m*) ≥ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)], and 
m* ≤ [(3q – 1) P2Pτ + 4(2q – 1)k – 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)]/[2(3q – 1)]. 
Proof XIX: See appendix A. 
The next result demonstrates increased exertion of effort and an increase in the 
expected payments to the agent from a reservation to a non-reservation level. In this case, 
use of monitoring encourages the agent to exert greater effort but also allocates the 
improvement in expected payoff from the project between the agent and the principal. 
This improvement is of sufficient size to cover the additional expense of the extra effort; 
the agent is better off in total from the principal’s decision to monitor. 
Result XX: For contracts (N3) and (N5), there exists monitoring functions that 
induce the agent to exert a higher level of effort, and this monitoring activity results in 
the agent’s expected payoff improving from a reservation level to a non-reservation level. 
For contract (N3), this can occur only in subsets of the contract’s conditions given 
by: 
(3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) and 
 2k/(3q – 1) < τ ≤ 2[(1 + q)k – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P. (XIII1) 
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For contract (N5) this can occur only in subsets of the contract’s conditions given 
by: 
1/3 < q < 1/2, k ≥ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], and 
2[(1 – q)k – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P < τ ≤ 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P, (XIII2) 
1/3 < q < 1/2, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), and 
 2qk/(3q – 1)P2 P < τ ≤ 2[(1 – q)k – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2P, (XIII3) 
{1/3 < q < 3/7 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 3/7 ≤ q < 1 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2k/(3q – 1) < τ ≤ 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
{3/7 ≤ q < 1/2 and 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k ≥ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2k/(3q – 1) < τ < 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), (XIII4) 
{1/3 < q < 3/7 and 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) ≤ k < (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), or 
 3/7 ≤ q < 1/2 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] < k < (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q)}, and 
  2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1) ≤ τ ≤ 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P, or 
1/3 < q < 1/2, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), and 
 2k/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ ≤ 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, (XIII5) 
{1/3 < q < 3/7 and 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) ≤ k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), or 
 3/7 ≤ q < 1/2 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] < k < (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q)}, and 
  2[(1 – q)k – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P ≤ τ < 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), or 
1/3 < q < 3/7, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] < k < 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
2[(1 – q)k – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P ≤ τ ≤ 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P, (XIII6) 
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{3/7 < q < 1/2 and 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) ≤ k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k ≥ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1) ≤ τ ≤ 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P, (XIII7) 
1/3 < q < 1/2, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), and 
 2[qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P < τ ≤ 2qk/(3q – 1) P2P, (XIII8) 
{1/3 < q < 1/2 and 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k > 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1) < τ ≤ 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P, or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), and 
  2qk/(3q – 1)P2 P < τ < 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, or (XIII9) 
{1/3 < q < 1/2 and 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k > 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2k/(3q – 1) < τ ≤ 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), or 
1/3 < q < 1, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
 2k/(3q – 1) < τ < 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P. (XIII10) 
For contract (N3), in the subset of conditions, the monitoring functions that 
achieve this outcome have the following forms: 
(1 – q)[2(k + R + υ) + (3q – 1)τ]/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ + 2(3q – 1)k + 2(1 + q)(R + υ)] ≤ 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)], 
  m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ/2 + R + υ – k(3qp – q – p + 1)/(qp + q + p – 1) for (XIII1). 
For contract (N5), in the subset of conditions, the monitoring functions that 
achieve this outcome have the following forms: 
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p(m*) ≥ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q), m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ + R + υ – 2qk(3q – 1) for (XIII2), 
(1 – q)/(3 – 5q) ≤ p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)[(3q – 1) P2Pτ – 4qk]/[(1 + q)(3q – 1) P2Pτ – 8q(1 – q)k], 
 m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ + R + υ – 2qk(3q – 1) for (XIII3), 
(1 – q)[2(k + R + υ) + (3q – 1)τ]/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ + 2(3q – 1)k + 2(1 + q)(R + υ)] ≤ 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)], 
  m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ + R + υ – 4qpk(pq + p + q – 1) for (XIII4), 
(1 – q)(3q – 1)τ/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk] ≤ p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q), 
 m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ + R + υ – 4qpk(pq + p + q – 1) for (XIII5), 
(1 – q)[2(k + R + υ) + (3q – 1)τ]/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ + 2(3q – 1)k + 2(1 + q)(R + υ)] ≤ 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q),  
 m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ + R + υ – 4qpk(pq + p + q – 1) for (XIII6), 
(1 – q)(3q – 1)τ/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk] ≤ 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)], 
   m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ + R + υ – 4qpk(pq + p + q – 1) for (XIII7), 
(1 – q)[2(R + υ) + (3q – 1)τ]/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk + 2(1 + q)(R + υ)] < 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q), 
  m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ/2 + R + υ – 2qpk(pq + p + q – 1) for (XIII8), 
(1 – q)[2(R + υ) + (3q – 1)τ]/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk + 2(1 + q)(R + υ)] < 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)(3q – 1)τ/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk], 
  m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ/2 + R + υ – 2qpk(pq + p + q – 1) for (XIII9), or 
(1 – q)[2(R + υ) + (3q – 1)τ]/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk + 2(1 + q)(R + υ)] < 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)(k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + k(1 – q)], 
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  m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ/2 + R + υ – 2qpk(pq + p + q – 1) for (XIII10). 
Proof XX: See appendix A. 
The next result demonstrates monitoring activity increasing the level of effort 
exerted by the agent. The expected payment to the agent changes from a non-reservation 
level to another non-reservation level. The expected payment to the agent can increase, 
decrease, or remain the same dependent on the project parameters. 
Result XXI: For contract (N4), there exists monitoring functions that induce the 
agent to exert a higher level of effort, and this monitoring activity results in the agent’s 
expected payoff changing from one non-reservation level to another non-reservation 
level. 
This can occur only in subsets of the contract’s conditions given by: 
1/3 < q < 1/2, k ≥ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], and 
 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ ≤ 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P, (XIV1) 
{1/3 < q < 3/7 and k ≥ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), or 
 3/7 ≤ q < 1 and k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)}, and 
  2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ < 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
1/3 < q < 3/7, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] < k < 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1) ≤ τ < 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P, (XIV2) 
1/3 < q < 3/7, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] < k < 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ < 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), (XIV3) 
{1/3 < q < 3/7 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 3/7 ≤ q < 1/2 and 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k < 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ < 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), or (XIV4) 
 
 82
{1/3 < q ≤ 3/7 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 3/7 < q < 1 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1) ≤ τ < 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
{3/7 < q < 1/2 and 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k > 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, and 
  2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ < 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P. (XIV5) 
The subset of conditions, the monitoring functions that achieve this outcome have 
the following forms: 
p(m*) ≥ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q), m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ/2 for (XIV1). 
(1 – q)(3q – 1)τ/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk] ≤ p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q), 
 m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ – 2q(5qp – q – 3p + 1)k/[(3q – 1)(qp + q + p – 1)] for (XIV2), 
(1 – q)[2(k + R + υ) + (3q – 1)τ]/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ + 2(3q – 1)k + 2(1 + q)(R + υ)] ≤ 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q), 
  m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ – 2q(5qp – q – 3p + 1)k/[(3q – 1)(qp + q + p – 1)] for (XIV3), 
(1 – q)[2(k + R + υ) + (3q – 1)τ]/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ + 2(3q – 1)k + 2(1 + q)(R + υ)] ≤ 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)], 
  m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ – 2q(5qp – q – 3p + 1)k/[(3q – 1)(qp + q + p – 1)] for (XIV4), 
(1 – q)(3q – 1)τ/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk] ≤ 
 p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[(1 + q)(R + υ) + 2k(1 – q)], 
  m* ≤ (3q – 1)τ – 2q(5qp – q – 3p + 1)k/[(3q – 1)(qp + q + p – 1)] for (XIV5). 
Proof XXI: See appendix A. 
 
The next result demonstrates monitoring will never lead to a decrease in effort 
exerted by the agent. 
Result XXII: Monitoring never results in a decrease in effort exerted by the 
agent. 
Proof XXII: See appendix A. 
Table 3 summarizes the results established above. Shaded cells represent regions 
where the mixture of changes in effort level and expected payoff to the agent are not 
possible. Cells denoted by the contents XXX represent situations where monitoring is the 
optimal strategy for certain monitoring functions. Blank cells represent situations where 





Table 3: Comparison of No Monitoring Contracts to Monitoring Contracts 
 
 Higher Effort Same Effort Lower Effort 
Agent’s 
Position Better Same Worse Better Same Worse Better Same Worse
Region 1          
Region 2      XXX    
Region 3      XXX    
Region 4 XXX XXX        
Region 5 XXX XXX XXX   XXX    
Region 6 XXX XXX        
Region 7          
Region 8          




Consider regions 1, 2, and 3. In these regions, the agent is exerting the maximum 
level of effort before any monitoring resources are brought to bear on the project. Thus, 
no increase in effort level is possible. For region 1, since the agent is already exerting 
maximum effort and receiving the reservation payoff, and since monitoring is costly, 
there is never any benefit for the principal in monitoring. Whereas, for regions 2 and 3, 
even though monitoring is costly, there is the potential to redistribute wealth from the 
agent to the principal. It has been shown in the above results that it is possible for the 
principal to monitor in regions 2 and 3, and redistribute the wealth from the agent to the 
principal. It has also been shown that monitoring never influences the agent to reduce the 
level of effort devoted to the project. 
For region 4, in the no-monitoring case, the agent exerts high effort in the first 
period, and low in the second, and receives an expected payment at the reservation level 
R. Therefore, the principal will never have the incentive to monitor in order to reduce or 
leave the effort level unchanged. Furthermore, the principal cannot use monitoring to 
increase effort and reduce the expected payments to the agent since the agent is already at 
the reservation level. The only remaining options are to use monitoring to increase effort 
level and for the principal to either share some of the increased payoff with the agent, or 
leave the agent’s position unchanged. It has been shown by the above results that it is 
possible for the principal to monitor in region 4, increasing the agent’s effort levels. In 
certain cases, all the gains of this increased effort accrue to the principal, in other cases 
the gains are shared between the agent and principal. 
Region 5 has similarities to region 4, however, the agent receives expected 
payments that bring his expected payoff above the reservation level R. Therefore, the 
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principal may have the incentive to monitor in order to reduce or leave the effort level 
unchanged if there is redistribution of wealth to the benefit of the principal. Furthermore, 
the principal could use monitoring to increase effort and reduce the expected payments to 
the agent. It has been shown in the above results, that it is possible for the principal to 
monitor in region 5, and either leave the agent’s effort levels unchanged, or increase the 
agent’s effort levels. In the former situation, the wealth is redistributed from the agent to 
the principal. In the latter situation, all three opportunities for wealth redistribution exist: 
Both principal and agent can share in the gains; all benefit accrues to the principal with 
no overall loss of benefit to the agent; and all benefit accrues to the principal with an 
overall loss of benefit to the agent. 
For region 6, 7, 8, and 9, in the no-monitoring case, the agent exerts low effort in 
both periods and receives an expected payment that brings his expected payoff to the 
reservation level R. Therefore, the principal cannot monitor to reduce or leave the effort 
level unchanged. Furthermore, the principal cannot use monitoring to increase effort and 
reduce the expected payments to the agent. This is the case since the agent is not 
extracting rents from these projects. This leaves monitoring as a method to increase effort 
level and for the principal either to share some of the increased payoff with the agent, or 
leave the agent’s position unchanged. It has been shown in the above results that 
monitoring is only an optimal strategy for the principal in region 6, where monitoring 
increases the agent’s effort levels. In certain cases, all the gains of this increased effort 





6.2 Solution of the Dual Problem 
Since the solutions to the principal-agent relationship were found using a linear 
programming methodology, there exists a dual problem for the original primal problem. 
The primal problem used to find contractual solutions that induce the entrepreneur to 
exert high effort in both periods was analyzed above and can be described as: 
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The corresponding dual problem is described by: 















Thus, the dual problem used to find contractual solutions that induce the 
entrepreneur to exert high effort in both periods is given by: 
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+H-1 + p + q+ p qL l4 ¥ H-1 + pL H1 - qL and  
λ B1B, λ B2 B, λ B3B, λ B4 B ≥ 0. 
The solution of dual problem in each case confirms the results of the primal 
problem analysis and describes shadow prices for the constraints described in the primal 
problems. For solutions to the primal problem where the reservation constraint was found 
to bind, the shadow prices for k and R + υ is 1. In other words, market conditions lead to 
a reduction in the cost of high effort, reservation payment or limited liability level then 
this will lead to a corresponding increase in the expected payoff to the principal. 
In the remaining solutions, the shadow price for R + υ is always zero. This is not 
surprising since the reservation constraint does not bind in these solutions. For the non-




Table 4: Shadow Prices of the Cost of Effort 
Contract Shadow Price of Cost of Effort 
M2 
2q
-1+ 3q  
M3 
p q
-1+ p + q + p q  
M5 
2p q
-1+ p + q + p q  
 
 
The shadow prices for the cost of effort for both M3 and M5 are lower than the 
shadow price when monitoring is not undertaken and the reservation constraint does not 
bind. Therefore, monitoring lessens the impact of cost of effort on the principal-agent 
relationship. 
6.3 Discussion of Empirical Implications 
The research presented in this paper can be discussed in the context of venture 
capital investments in entrepreneurial projects. The wealth of empirical research devoted 
to this form of investment makes it an ideal topic to illustrate the theoretical work 
presented in this paper. Whereas venture capital can be thought of in the general context 
of financing new ventures, in this discussion venture capital will refer specifically to 
finance supplied by venture capital organizations. 
Within the context of my research, the venture capitalist would represent the 
principal, and the entrepreneur the agent. The venture capitalist is in a position to fund 
fully the entrepreneur’s project, possibly in syndication with other venture capitalist. The 
two parties must agree on a contract to compensate the entrepreneur for his involvement 
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with the project and the venture capitalist has to decide on the level of monitoring to use 
in the assessment of the entrepreneur’s actions. 
Venture capitalists focus their investments on high-risk projects where the 
opportunity for high payouts exists, but the probability of failure is high. Huntsman and 
Hoban (1980) investigation of venture capital investments finds high returns but also 
found that exclusion of the top 10% of performers leaves the remaining investments as 
losers on average. Chiampou and Kallett (1989) find venture capital investments return 
on average 17.5%, which is considered very high. The investments also exhibit high risk 
measured as standard deviation of returns of 37.6%. The assets of these projects are often 
intangible and are difficult to value. Sahlman (1990) notes that the [venture capital] 
environment is characterized by substantial uncertainty about payoffs… and a high 
degree of information asymmetry between principals and agents. In the models presented 
in this paper, high-risk projects where the opportunity for profits is substantial can be 
thought of as projects where probability of success, q, is low and the dispersion of 
payouts, τ, is high. 
The value of these projects rests with the human capital – the entrepreneurs – 
running the projects. Gorman and Sahlman (1989) report that venture capitalists identify 
weak management as the main reason for project failure. In the context of the models 
presented in this paper, the high value placed on human capital can be thought of as 
projects where the cost of effort, k, is high. This reflects both the time that an 
entrepreneur must devote to the project and the prior costs associated with the 
entrepreneur’s effort such as securing a good education and acquiring experience.  
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The venture capitalists actively manage these projects through hands on 
monitoring and staging of financing [see Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Barry et al., 
(1990) and Gompers (1995) for a discussion of the role of monitoring in venture capital 
investments].TP40 PT Rosenstein et al., (1993) find that from the entrepreneur’s point of view 
the venture capitalists are useful in monitoring financial performance, serving as a 
sounding board and for the recruitment/replacement of the CEO. They add value to 
projects through monitoring, but will also use monitoring to justify removal of the 
entrepreneurs when the monitoring results justify the action. 
Projects that could be described as a venture capital – entrepreneur type project in 
the models presented herein, will have high levels of payout dispersion, τ, high cost of 
agent effort, k, and low levels of the likelihood of project success, q. Somewhat 
arbitrarily, consider projects with the following parameters: 
1/3 < q < 1/2, k ≥ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], and τ ≥ 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P. 
For these projects, there exists a non-reservation, no-monitoring contractual 
solution of the form {4k/(3q – 1) – υ, –υ, –υ}. There are also two possible monitoring 
contractual solutions. The first is of the form {2k/[(3q – 1)p] – υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ} 
which dominates all other contracts for monitoring functions where 
p(m*) ≥ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) and m* ≤ 2qk/(3q – 1). 
                                                 
TP
40
PT The monitoring role is not the only value-added service provided by the venture capitalist. The venture 
capitalist also acts as a screen to ensure worthwhile projects are funded. Furthermore, the reputation of the 
venture capitalist also plays various roles in the relationship between venture capitalist, entrepreneur and 
outside investors [Hsu (2004), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Timmons and Bygrave (1986)]. Venture 
capitalists are also proficient in ensuring that investments that subsequently raise public equity do so at the 
right time [Lerner (1994b)]. 
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The second has the form {4k/(qp + q + p – 1) – υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ} which 
dominates all other contracts for monitoring functions where p(m*) ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) and  
m* ≤ 4q(1 – q)(2p – 1)/[(3q – 1)(q + p + qp – 1)]. 
Each of the contracts is dichotomous: If the results of monitoring reveal the action 
of the agent to be acceptable, the agent is paid according to a predetermined schedule; 
otherwise, the agent receives a fixed payment. This confirms a result found by Harris and 
Raviv (1979) that monitoring activity leads to dichotomous contracts: The agent is 
rewarded if the project is successful and monitoring finds the agent working at the 
principal’s preferred level, else the agent is punished. 
For these projects, the monitoring activity does not increase the expected payoff 
from the project and does not induce the agent to exert higher levels of effort. However, 
monitoring will redistribute the expected payoffs from the agent to the principal. This 
agrees with Rosenstein et al., (1993) findings that the involvement of venture capitalists 
monitoring the performance of the entrepreneur does not improve project performance. 
For all three contracts, the incentive component of each contract is decreasing in 
the likelihood of success, q. In other words, the entrepreneur requires greater incentive 
intensity when the likelihood of success decreases. In this case incentive intensity will be 
high when the entrepreneur has a greater impact on project success; projects with low 
levels of likelihood of success, q, do not respond as effectively to the entrepreneur’s 
efforts. This result agrees with Sahlman (1990) research that shows that low likelihood of 
success but high levels of entrepreneurial incentives typify venture capital projects. My 
work also confirms results established by Gompers (1995) that shows that a low 
likelihood of success in entrepreneurial ventures leads to greater monitoring intensity. 
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With the two monitoring contracts, the standard deviation of the entrepreneur’s 
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Both of the expressions are strictly decreasing in both p and q. In other words, as 
project risk increases greater levels of risk are transferred to the entrepreneur. This 
confirms a finding by Sahlman (1990). TP41 PT 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) in their survey of venture capital investments 
categorize risk into internal and external. Uncertainty about the entrepreneur’s ability, 
operations of the project being hard to observe, the discretion the entrepreneur has for the 
use of funds are all described as internal risks. Risks that are common to both venture 
capitalist and entrepreneur are described as external risk. External risks within the context 
of my model are captured by the probability of success parameter, q. Internal risks are not 
explicitly measured within my models. Kaplan and Strömberg find that projects with high 
external risk are associated with high levels of incentive pay. This is, once again, 
consistent with my results. This result has been shown to arise in practice many years ago 
in the context of rice farming in Malaysia. Huang (1973) explains the prevalence of 
sharecropping, which is a classic form of incentive pay, in farming regions where harvest 
uncertainty is driven by external parameters such as the weather. 
                                                 
TP
41
PT Sahlman (1990) notes that entrepreneurs in venture capital relationships are undiversified and thus are 
concerned with total risk rather than market risk. 
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6.4 Impact of Probability of Success, Reservation Level, and Level of Limited 
Liability 
It is useful to consider the impact of underlying project parameters on the optimal 
strategies for principal and agent. Consider the regions 1, 7, 8, and 9 of figure 3. These 
regions are defined by the following parameters: 
Region 1:  τ ≥ 2k/(3q – 1)     and     k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] 
Regions 7, 8 and 9 τ ≤ 2k/(3q – 1). 
From the results presented in this chapter, in these regions, monitoring is never 
the optimal strategy. Consider the effect of increasing levels of probability of success, q. 
The boundary, 2k/(3q – 1) is a decreasing function of q with the limiting value of k for 
q = 1. Thus, as the probability of success increases, the boundary bisects the project space 
described by the parameters τ and k. Also, the boundary (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] is an 
increasing function of the probability of success, the reservation payout and the limited 
liability value. 
Therefore, if it is possible to increase the value of any of these three parameters 
then there is a greater likelihood that the project will not be subject to monitoring. It may 
be possible for the principal to alter the operational characteristics of the project to 
improve the probability of success. It is unlikely that the reservation payout can be 
changed, as this is an exogenous parameter outside the principal’s control. It certainly is 
possible to vary the limited liability parameter through the recruitment process. 
Therefore, the choice of an agent who brings a sufficiently large personal investment to 
the project could remove the need to monitor. 
 
CHAPTER 7 




Part 1 extends research on the relationship between principal and agent where 
moral hazard exists and contractual payments to the agent are restricted by a limited 
liability constraint. A simple model is used to investigate the impact of incentives and 
monitoring on this relationship. Actual contractual forms are derived and their structure is 
investigated. Furthermore, the effects of the impact of the communication of monitoring 
results at an interim stage are considered. 
First, a model was investigated that allowed for only incentive contracts as a 
means to influence agent effort. In this case, it was found that the reservation constraint 
does not always bind and, therefore, the agent can extract rents from the project. This 
occurs for projects where agent involvement is costly and the project yields high payoffs. 
In these projects, there are sufficient levels of project payoffs to compensate the agent 
with expected payments greater than those, which could be generated by alternative 
employment. 
Second, monitoring was introduced with no interim communication of results. In 
this case there existed certain circumstances where monitoring was never the optimal 
strategy regardless on the form of monitoring technologies available. This occurred in 
regions where contractual incentives were sufficient to induce the agent to exert effort at 
the preferred level while receiving expected payoffs that yielded the reservation level. It 
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also occurred in regions where increased project payouts generated from higher levels of 
agent effort are insufficient to compensate the agent for the cost of this increased effort. 
When monitoring does have an impact on the principal-agent relationship, two 
effects are found to exist. Circumstances exist where monitoring encourages the agent to 
exert higher levels of effort. There are also circumstances in which payoffs from the 
project are redistributed between the parties. This redistribution is not a one-way street 
flowing from the agent to the principal. In situations where the agent is encouraged by 
monitoring to exert higher levels of effort, there are circumstances where both the 
principal and agent enjoy the rewards of the extra effort as both parties share in the 








PREFACE: MONITORING WITH COMMUNICATION 
 
 
The purpose of part 2 of this dissertation is to extend the analysis of part 1 on 
monitoring and incentives to allow for monitoring results to be shared by the principal 
with the agent at an interim stage. Due to the intricacy of the calculations necessary to 
solve the associated optimization problems and the complexity of the description of the 
results, I will focus the analysis only on regions of parameters that are of particular 
interest when investigating venture capital – entrepreneur relationships. 
In my analysis, actual contracts will be constructed and investigated and the 
optimal mix of incentives and monitoring intensity will be established.42 The effects of 
sharing interim monitoring information on the principal-agent relationship – distribution 
of wealth, change in effort levels, and distribution of risk – will also be analyzed. Of 
particular interest will be the impact of information sharing on the level of risk accepted 
by the agent: The application of imperfect monitoring leads to increased risk borne by the 
agent over the risk associated with non-monitoring strategies.43 Part 2 will study whether 
risk associated with imperfect monitoring is reduced from the agent’s perspective if 
interim monitoring results are shared. 
In order to understand the role that sharing of monitoring results will play in a 
principal-agent relationship consider the following general setup.44 The principal employs 
an agent to manage a project. The success of the project will be dependent on, among 
                                                 
42 Definitions of incentive and monitoring intensity can be found in part 1 of this dissertation and in the 
work that follows. 
43 This result was established in part 1. 




other factors, the effort exerted by the agent in his role of manager of the project. The 
principal’s goal is to induce a certain level of effort from an agent in order to maximize 
the principal’s share of project payoffs. If the principal can directly observe the effort of 
the agent, no moral-hazard issue exists and the principal can achieve his goal through the 
negotiation of a contract with the agent. However, if the level of agent effort is not 
directly observable45, then the principal has two choices. 
First, the principal can negotiate with the agent an incentive contract based on the 
payoff from the project.46 Second, the principal can negotiate with the agent an incentive 
contract, based on the payoff of the project, and information received from monitoring 
the agent’s actions. 
When a principal monitors an agent’s effort, monitoring can lead to either the 
redistribution of wealth, changes in the agent’s effort levels, or liquidation of the project. 
Results from part 1 shows that monitoring will never induce the agent to reduce effort 
levels, however, when monitoring induces the agent to increase effort, in some 
circumstances, dependent on the parameters of the project, some of the increased payoff 
from the project is allocated to the agent. In these cases, even after accounting for the cost 
of the additional effort, the agent will improve his share of wealth and extract rents from 
the project.47 This result is reliant on the non-binding of the reservation constraint. 
                                                 
45 If there exist exogenous random events that effect the payoff from the project, which are not directly 
observable by the principal, then the payoff from the project will be a noisy measure of the agent’s actions. 
A classic example of this kind of exogenous random event would be the effects of weather on the crop 
yields of a farm managed by a tenant on behalf of a landlord. The level of crops produced by the farm is not 
only dependent on the work of the tenant but is also effected by the weather, which is outside the control of 
the tenant. If the landlord cannot perfectly assess the weather’s effects on crop yields then the yields will 
also lead to imperfect estimates of the tenant’s effort. 
46 Incentive contracts are used to align the actions of the agent with the desires of the principal; they were 
formally defined in chapter 4 of part 1. 
47 Rent in this context represents the utility in excess of the minimum utility available to the agent through 
seeking alternative employment in the labor market. 
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The two-period model introduced in part 1 of this dissertation and extended in 
part 2 allows the principal to monitor during the first period, receiving the results of this 
monitoring before the second period begins. In part 2, monitoring provides a signal of 
effort, which the principal uses as a factor to compensate the agent and it allows the 
principal to share the signals of first-period effort generated by monitoring with the agent, 
at the end of the first period. The implications of the last point, sharing of monitoring 
results at an interim stage on the relationship between principal and agent, has not been 
previously modeled and thus, brings originality to my research. When the principal shares 
monitoring results at an interim stage, the following questions can be investigated: Is it 
beneficial for the principal to share the results of monitoring or is it best to keep the agent 
in the dark? And, if the sharing of monitoring results is possible and desirable from the 
principal’s point of view, what strategies will the agent employ?48 My research finds that 
it can be beneficial for the principal to share this interim monitoring information with the 
agent since it will shift monitoring risk from the agent to the principal.49
It is clear that the sharing of information does change the nature of the agent’s 
strategies and greatly extends the agent’s range of possible actions. This is the case since 
the agent can condition his post-monitoring effort on the outcome of monitoring. For 
instance, if the principal monitors and finds the agent exerting effort at a low level, then 
sharing these findings with the agent may induce him to change his level of effort in the 
future. There are two assumptions implicit in this discussion. First, the results of 
monitoring have to be verifiable by the agent and cannot be forged by the principal. This 
stops the principal reducing contractual payments to the agent based on fictitious 
                                                 
48 In the context of this research, the agent’s strategic decision is what level of effort to devote to the 
project. 
49 Monitoring risk refers to the principal receiving an erroneous signal of agent effort. 
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information on prior effort levels; the monitoring results have to be auditable in some 
sense by the agent. Second, even if the agent shares new information with the principal to 
correct erroneous signals generated by monitoring, the principal cannot assimilate this 
new information into his monitoring results without cost. In other words, all monitoring 
has some cost associated with it. 
Part 2 is organized as follows. In chapter 9, I give a general description of the 
assumptions of the models and an overview of the methodology used to optimize the 
principal and agent’s strategies. The results are considered in chapter 10. Chapter 11 
concludes part 2. A brief review of the literature concerning the principal-agent problem 





METHODOLOGY: MONITORING WITH COMMUNICATION 
 
 
A two-period model was developed in part 1 to consider the relationship between 
principal and agent. Two variants of this model were considered in part 1. In the first, the 
principal did not monitor the agent and, therefore, the contract between the two parties 
was solely based on the payoff from the project. The second model involved monitoring 
agent effort during period one. In this model, the results of monitoring are not shared 
with the agent until the end of the project: The signal of agent effort obtained from 
monitoring was incorporated into the contractual payment from the principal to the agent. 
In the third model, which is the focus of part 2, monitoring will be undertaken during the 
first period and the results of this monitoring can be shared with the agent at the end of 
the first period. This final model allows the agent to modify his actions in period two, 
based on the monitoring results from period one. Once again, the signal of agent effort 
will be incorporated into the contractual payment from the principal to the agent. Certain 
structures and parameters are common to all three models, and were described in part 1: 
They will be defined again in this chapter to allow part 2 to be considered in its own 
regard. 
For all three models, it is assumed that the principal has a fully funded project and 
at the commencement of the project, and these funds will be sufficient through the end of 
the second period. The principal is risk neutral and maximizes his expected returns.50 The 
                                                 
50 The assumption that the principal is risk neutral is a common simplification in research on the principal-




return to the principal will consist of the gross payoff from the project less the contractual 
payment to the agent and any resources spent on monitoring. 
It is assumed that the agent is also risk neutral. The agent will maximize expected 
net returns, which are defined as contractual payments received from the principal less 
the agent’s cost of effort. It is assumed that the agent brings wealth to the project in the 
amount of υ ≥ 0: Any contract agreed with the principal cannot generate losses for the 
agent in any state of the world that exceeds υ. Thus, the agent has limited liability.TP51 PT The 
amount υ can be thought of as the agent’s investment in the project; the principal in 
effect requires the agent to invest his own capital in the project.TP52 PT It is assumed that the 
agent does earn a return on the capital invested in the project.TP53 PT This assumption will 
greatly simplify the analysis of the contractual solutions of the models.TP54 PT 
The model evolves over two periods. The two parties agree on a contract at time 
zero; also, the agent decides on the level of effort to exert on the project during period 
one, and the principal decides on the level of monitoring, if any, to use during this 
period.TP55 PT If the principal monitors the agent, the principal can estimate at time one the 
level of effort exerted by the agent during period one. If the results of monitoring are 
                                                 
TP
51
PT The inclusion of a limited liability constraint is common in research that includes risk neutrality for the 
agent. See Demougin and Fluet (2001), Dmougin and Garvie (1991), Innes (1989) and Sappington (1981) 
for implementations of limited liability with risk-neutrality, and see Sappington (1991) for an illustration of 
why the assumption of limited liability with risk neutrality can generate incentive contracts solutions to the 
principal-agent problem with moral hazard in the same manner as the assumption of risk aversion. 
TP
52
PT The assumption of limited liability introduces a wealth effect into the models investigated. The agent’s 
decisions on effort levels and the contracts negotiated between the two parties will be directly impacted by 
the wealth of the agent. Although this will complicate solutions to models, it will also add another 
dimension to the analysis of the relationship between principal and agent. 
TP
53
PT The limited liability value, υ, can be defined as a “with return” value, so that the capital invested by the 
agent, say ζ, earns a return of ρ so that υ = (1 + ρ)ζ. 
TP
54
PT It is straightforward to demonstrate that if both parties are risk neutral, then the moral hazard issue can be 
resolved by the principal franchising the project to the agent. 
TP
55
PT If the principal does not monitor the agent’s effort during period one, the agent can decide on the level of 
effort in both periods at time zero since no additional information will be available at time one to change 
the agent’s decision. 
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shared with the agent at this intermediate stage, then this leads to an expanded choice of 
strategic decisions for the agent since his period-two effort can be conditioned on the 
outcome of the principal’s monitoring results. The project matures at time two and both 
parties receive payments from the project. 
At time zero, the agent has to decide whether to accept the negotiated contract.TP56 PT 
It is assumed that there is a competitive market for the agent's talents and if he does not 
accept the current project, he can receive the equivalent of R at time two in the market.TP57 PT 
There is no cost to the agent in the assessment of the project before he agrees to accept 
the contract. The agent’s strategy is to decide whether to accept the contract, and if he 
does so, the level of effort to devote to the project. Since there are two periods, the agent 
will decide on effort levels in both periods. In part 1 where the principal does not 
monitor, or does monitor at time one and does not share the signal of effort with the 
agent, the agent can decide on his effort level in both periods at time zero. In this case, 
there is no new information generated during the project with which the agent can modify 
his effort decisions in period two. In part 2, the principal can monitor during period one 
and can share the signal of effort with the agent at time one. If this is the optimal strategy 
for the principal then the agent can decide on the level of effort in period two conditioned 
on this signal. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the agent cannot quit the project 
at the end of period one and seek alternative employment: The contract implicitly 
contains a penalty that will make alternative employment an unacceptable strategy during 
                                                 
TP
56
PT Throughout the analysis herein, the assumption used in most research and described in Sappington 
(1991) will be used: It is assumed, that when the agent is indifferent among strategies, the agent will choose 
the strategy most preferred by the principal. 
TP
57
PT This reservation constraint ensures that the expected return of the agent must meet or exceed R plus the 
repayment of the limited liability value, υ. The returns in both cases are net of the cost of effort. 
 
 105
period two. TP58 PT This means quasi-rent in period two, from remaining employed in the 
project, is always positive and thus, the agent will never quit the project at time one and, 
therefore, will always take the project to completion. 
The project's payoff will be dependent on the two periods of agent's effort and a 
random element. There are three possible payoffs from the project at the end of period 
two. These are given by τ + V, V, and V – τ, where τ > 0. It is assumed that the agent can 
exert one of two levels of effort in each of the periods, high or low. Thus, there are four 
two-period effort strategies; high-high, high-low, low-high, or low-low. The effort 
exerted by the agent in each period is costly. It is assumed that the cost measured in time-
two dollars is given by k for high effort and zero for low effort. For the project payoff 
purposes, it is assumed that the two choices, high-low or low-high lead to the same 
probability distribution for the project payoffs. 







































Where row one represents high-high effort, row two high-low effort or low-high 
effort, row three low-low effort; column one payoff τ + V, column two payoff V, and 
column three payoff V – τ. It is assumed that q > ⅓ which implies that the outcomes with 
the highest probabilities are on the diagonal of the payoff matrix. Therefore, higher effort 
levels result in a greater probability of project success as measured by project payoff. It is 
                                                 
TP
58
PT In the analysis that follows, this penalty will not explicitly be introduced as it is assumed that the penalty 
is sufficient to ensure that the agent will never quit at time one. 
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assumed that both principal and agent are aware of the probability distribution and are 
aware of the effect of agent’s effort on the payoffs from the project before a contract is 
negotiated.TP59 PT 
When the agent exerts low effort in both periods the expected return from the 
project before cost of effort is considered is given by V – (3q – 1)τ/2. This payoff 
increases to V as the agent increases effort from low to high in one of the periods, and 
V + (3q – 1)τ/2 as the agent increases his effort to high in both periods. Therefore in both 
cases, an increase in effort cost of k yields and increase in project payoffs (3q – 1)τ/2. 
The ratio (3q – 1)τ/2k will be defined as the return to effort. This ratio measures the extra 
project payoff generated by inducing the agent to increase his effort in one period. 
Within this framework, there are a number of different possibilities for monitoring 
and communication. Diagram 1 describes the different models. 
Model I is the baseline model. In this case, the principal does not monitor. The 
contract between the two parties can only be based on the outcome of the project, which 
has three possible payouts. Therefore, the contract negotiated between the agent and 
principal is of the form (σ B1B, σ B2 B, σB3 B). The principal always has the choice to resort to this 
format if the expected payoff from model I to the principal dominates expected payoffs 
from the other models. 
In model II, the principal monitors during period one but does not share the 
outcome of the monitoring until completion of the project. Since the principal’s 
monitoring generates a signal of period one effort, this signal is available to supplement 
the project payoff information in the contract structure. There is an implicit assumption 
                                                 
TP
59
PT Although the probability distribution is known, the realized value of the project’s payoffs will not be 
discovered until the maturity of the project. 
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that the results of monitoring can be shared with the agent at time two and that the agent 
can verify without cost the results of monitoring. This avoids the problem of the principal 
falsifying the results of monitoring to his benefit. There is an additional assumption that 
the agent cannot change the principal’s estimate of effort by supplying information to 
him without the principal spending more resources on monitoring that new information. 
In this way, the agent cannot supplement the principal’s monitoring results without 
additional cost being incurred by the principal. The contract will be of the form 
(σBH1 B, σ BH2 B, σBH3 B, σ BL1 B, σBL2 B, σ BL3 B) where the suffix H and L refers to the estimate of effort 
discovered by the principal through the monitoring process during period one. In this 
model, because of the lack of communication between the two parties, the agent’s 
available strategies do not change from the no-monitoring model: The agent will still 
have to decide whether to exert high or low effort in the second period without any 
additional information. 
Model III, which is the focus of part 2 of this dissertation, represents situations in 
which the principal monitors during period one and shares the results of the monitoring 
with the agent at time one. The decision to share the information is made ex ante since it 
is assumed that the policy of sharing of information is negotiated at the same time as the 
terms of the contract between the principal and agent are negotiated. The same 
assumptions hold as with model II: The principal can share the monitoring results with 
the agent without cost and the agent cannot supplement these monitoring results with 
additional information at no cost to the principal. In this case, the agent can modify his 
second period effort based on the results of the monitoring. As with model II, the contract 
will be of the form (σ BH1 B, σ BH2 B, σBH3 B, σ BL1 B, σBL2 B, σ BL3 B) where the suffix H and L refers to the 
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estimate of effort discovered during the monitoring process in the first period. In this 
model, the strategies available to the agent have increased in number and sophistication 
since the agent can now condition his second-period effort on the outcome of the first-
period monitoring. The question then becomes whether the principal benefits from 
sharing information at an interim stage and thus improving the strategic choices of the 
agent. 
In the monitoring models II and III, it is assumed that the principal can monitor 
during period one to estimate the agent’s effort level in the first period. The amount of 
monitoring resources spent will be defined as m ∈ [η, M) where M > η > 0. The lower 
level of monitoring η represents a fixed cost of monitoring; this amount must be spent 
before any useful signal of effort can be received. The upper level of monitoring, M is the 
amount necessary to establish with certainty the true effort level. The probability of 
discovering the true effort level will be defined as p(m) where p(M) = 1 > p(η) > ½, 




SOLUTIONS WHERE MONITORING IS AVAILABLE AND 
INFORMATION IS SHARED 
 
 
In this chapter, the principal’s ability to communicate the monitoring results to the 
agent at the end of period one is considered. At time zero, the two parties agree on the 
contract (σBH1 B, σBH2 B, σ BH3 B, σ BL1 B, σBL2 B, σ BL3 B), where σBH1 B is paid to the agent if monitoring 
generates a signal of first period effort being high and the project payoff is τ + V, σ BH2 B if 
monitoring generates a signal of first period effort being high and the project payoff is V, 
and so on. It is also assumed at time zero that the principal and agent agree as to whether 
the results of monitoring will be shared at time one. This assumption will simplify the 
analysis since it will eliminate possible strategies for the principal as to when to share 
monitoring information. Allowing the principal to decide ex post on whether to share 
monitoring information at the interim stage would allow for the principal to implement 
this strategy randomly: The decision to share information could be based on the possible 
application of mixed strategies. I assume, to allow a simplified model to be studied, that 
only pure strategies are available to the principal at the interim stage. In this simplified 
model, the agent will be able to infer the results of monitoring at the interim stage based 
on whether the principal shares information. Due to the limited-liability restriction, the 
contract must be structured to ensure that σBH1 B, σ BH2 B, σ BH3B, σ BL1 B, σ BL2 B, σBL3 B ≥ 0. 
In this model, the strategies available to the entrepreneur have increased in 
number and sophistication over those available in models I and II since the agent can now 
condition his second-period effort on the results of the first-period monitoring. The 
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question now becomes whether the principal benefits from sharing information at an 
interim stage even though this sharing improves the strategic choices for the 
entrepreneur. 
The following notation will describe the available strategies for the agent – XYZ, 
where X describes the effort level exerted in the first period; the agent makes the decision 
on this effort level at time zero. Y describes the effort level in the second period if the 
monitoring generates an estimate of first period effort as being at the high level. Finally, 
Z describes the effort level in the second period if the monitoring generates an estimate of 
first period effort as being at the low level.TP60 PT Therefore, each of the X, Y, and Z can take 
values of H for high effort level, or L for low effort level. Considering the various mixes 
of first and second-period strategies and result of monitoring, the following strategies are 
available to the agent: 
HHH ≡ High effort in first period and high effort in second period whatever the 
outcome of monitoring. 
HHL ≡ High effort in first period and, if monitoring correctly deduces the period 
one effort as being high, the agent exerts high effort in the second period. 
If the period one monitoring incorrectly deduces the period one effort as 
being low, the agent exerts low effort in the second period. 
HLH ≡ High effort in first period and, if the period one monitoring correctly 
deduces the period one effort as being high, the agent exerts low effort in 
the second period. If the period one monitoring incorrectly deduces the 
                                                 
TP
60
PT Both decisions Y and Z can be based on erroneous monitoring signals. For example, if the agent exerts 
high effort in the first period but monitoring indicates the agent exerted low effort, then his second period 
strategy will be Z. 
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period one effort as being low, the agent exerts high effort in the second 
period. 
HLL ≡  High effort in first period and low effort in second period whatever the 
outcome of monitoring. 
LHH ≡ Low effort in first period and high effort in second period whatever the 
outcome of monitoring. 
LHL ≡  Low effort in first period and, if the period one monitoring incorrectly 
deduces the period one effort as being high, the agent exerts high effort in 
the second period. If the period one monitoring correctly deduces the 
period one effort as being low, the agent exerts low effort in the second 
period. 
LLH ≡  Low effort in first period and, if the period one monitoring incorrectly 
deduces the period one effort as being high, the agent exerts low effort in 
the second period. If the period one monitoring correctly deduces the 
period one effort as being low, the agent exerts high effort in the second 
period. 
LLL ≡  Low effort in first period and low effort in second period whatever the 
outcome of monitoring. 
The methodology for finding optimal strategies is identical for the non-
communication case. Furthermore, the results are detailed and lengthy and, therefore, the 
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Figure 4: Analysis of Information Sharing Contracts in Region 2 
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The axes on this chart do not meet at the origin; the focus is on region 2 and axis 
drawn to scale would obscure the detail of this region. The labels for regions 1 and 3 are 
included for reference purposes. The bold lines demonstrate the boundaries of regions 1, 
2 and 3 in the no-monitoring case. 
Instead of solving for all possible combinations of parameters k and τ, the 
analysis will be restricted to regions 1 and 2 of the non-monitoring case defined by the 
following conditions: 
Region 1 : t ¥
2 k
-1 + 3 q
andk §
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H1 - qL  
Region 2 : t ¥
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
and
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
2 H1 - qL
§ k §
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
1 - q  
As will be seen from the analysis that follows, region 1 demonstrates situations 
where monitoring, with or without sharing of information at an interim stage, is not the 
strategy for the principal that maximizes his expected payout. This will be in contrast to 
region 2 where sharing of interim monitoring information is sometimes the strategy that 
maximizes the expected payoff to the principal and can lead to shifting of risk between 
the two parties. 
To solve this system, the contracts that induce a particular strategy from the agent 
at the minimum of cost to the principal, given a fixed level of monitoring resources m, 
are established. When the contracts that induce HHH, HHL, HLH, HLL, LHH, LHL, 
LLH or LLL strategies have been constructed, the payoffs across strategies can be 
compared. As was seen in the non-communication case in part 1, for any project given a 
cost of effort, k, and a level of project payoff spread, τ, either a single contract and 
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monitoring strategy will dominate, or multiple contracts and monitoring strategies will 
dominate and the single optimal solution will be dependent on the form of monitoring 
function. 
First, consider the principal’s strategy that induces high effort in both periods 
regardless of the signal received from monitoring at time one. Suppose it is believed that 
the contract (σBH1 B, σ BH2 B, σBH3 B, σ BL1 B, σBL2 B, σ BL3 B) will induce this action. Given this contract, and 
a level of monitoring resources m, the expected payout to the agent will be: 
UHHH ª -2 k + p qsH1 + H1 - pL qsL1 +
1
2
H1 - qL Hp HsH2 + sH3L + H1 - pL HsL2 + sL3LL  
In order for this contract to compel the agent to exert high effort in both periods 
regardless of monitoring results, the expected payoff to the agent must be greater than 
those generated by the other seven available agent strategies. Extending the definition 






-2 k + p qsH1 - 12
p H-1 + qL HsH2 + sH3L - H-1 + pL qsL1
+ 1
2
H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsL2 + sL3L
-k H1 + pL + p qsH1 - 12 p H-1 + qL HsH2 + sH3L - H-1 + pL qsL2
+ 1
2
H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsL1 + sL3L
k H-2 + pL + p qsH2 - 12 p H-1 + qL HsH1 + sH3L - H-1 + pL qsL1
+ 1
2
H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsL2 + sL3L
-k - 1
2
p H-sH1 + qsH1 - 2 qsH2 - sH3 + qsH3L - H-1 + pL qsL2
+ 1
2
H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsL1 + sL3L
-k - H-1 + pL qsH2 + 12 H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsH1 + sH3L + p qsL2
- 1
2
p H-1 + qL HsL1 + sL3L
k H-1 + pL - H-1 + pL qsH2 + 12 H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsH1 + sH3L
- 1
2
p H-1 + qL HsL1 + sL2L + p qsL3
-k p + 1
2
H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsH1 + sH2L - H-1 + pL qsH3 + p qsL2
- 1
2
p H-1 + qL HsL1 + sL3L
1
2
H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsH1 + sH2L - H-1 + pL qsH3
- 1
2




















In order for the contract and level of monitoring to induce high effort in both 
periods regardless of monitoring signals, the payout matrix and the reservation utility 
must conform to the following constraints: 






































-2 k - R - u + p qsH1 - 12
p H-1 + qL HsH2 + sH3L - H-1 + pL qsL1
+ 1
2
H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsL2 + sL3L
0
k H-1 + pL - 1
2
H-1 + pL H-1 + 3 qL HsL1 - sL2L
-k p + 1
2
p H-1 + 3 qL HsH1 - sH2L
-k + 1
2
p H-1 + 3 qL HsH1 - sH2L - 12 H-1 + pL H-1 + 3 qL HsL1 - sL2L
-k + 1
2
Hp - 2 q+ p qL HsH2 - sL1L + 12 H-1 + p + q + p qL HsH1 - sL2L
- 1
2
H-1 + 2 pL H-1 + qL HsH3 - sL3L
k H-1 - pL + 1
2
Hp - 2 q+ p qL HsH2 - sL1L - 12 H-1 + 2 pL H-1 + qL HsH3 - sL2L
+ 1
2
H-1 + p + q+ p qL HsH1 - sL3L
k H-2 + pL + 1
2
Hp - 2 q+ p qL HsH3 - sL1L + 12 H-1 + p + q+ p qL HsH1 - sL2L
- 1
2
H-1 + 2 pL H-1 + qL HsH2 - sL3L
-2 k + 1
2
Hp - 2 q+ p qL HsH3 - sL1L - 12 H-1 + 2 pL H-1 + qL HsH2 - sL2L
+ 1
2





The first constraint ensures that the contract allows the agent to make at least the 
reservation payoff when exerting high effort in both periods, and receives back the wealth 
invested in the project. The remaining eight constraints ensure that the HHH strategy 
dominates all other strategies. The constraint γ1cons is included for completeness. There 
are also six other constraints generated by the limited liability restriction: 
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σ BH1 B, σBH2 B, σ BH3 B, σBL1 B, σ BL2 B, σ BL3 B ≥ 0. 
Because the interim monitoring results are shared, there are two additional 
constraints. Suppose the monitoring process correctly assess the first period effort as 
high. The contract must ensure that high effort in the second period is still the optimal 
decision for the agent conditional on this monitoring information. 
If the monitoring results confirm high effort in the first period then the agent will 
be paid σBH1 B if the project pays τ + V, σ BH2 B if the project pays V, and σBH3 B if the project 
pays V – τ. If the agent exerts high effort in the second period then the probability of 







H1 - qL, respectively.
 
If the agent exerts low effort in the second period then the probability of these 
payoffs occurring are: 
1
2
H1- qL, q, and
1
2
H1 - qL, respectively.
 
Therefore, the following condition will ensure that high effort in the second 
period is still the optimal decision for the agent conditional on this monitoring 
information confirming high effort in the first period: 
-k + qsH1 +
1
2
H1 - qL sH2 +
1
2




H1 - qL sH1 + qsH2 +
1
2
H1 - qL sH3
 
Suppose instead that the monitoring results incorrectly assess the first period 
effort as low. The contract must ensure that high effort in the second period is still the 
optimal decision for the agent given this time one information. Using similar arguments 
to those stated above, the following condition would ensure this is the case: 
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-k + qsL1 +
1
2
H1 - qL sL2 +
1
2




H1 - qL sL1 + qsL2 +
1
2
H1 - qL sL3
 
Given high effort in both periods and the contract (σBH1B, σ BH2 B, σ BH3 B, σBL1 B, σ BL2 B, σBL3 B) the 
expected payoff to the principal is: 
VHHH ª -m+ V+
1
2
H-1 + 3 qL t - p qsH1 +
1
2
p H-1 + qL HsH2 + sH3L
+H-1 + pL qsL1 -
1
2
H-1 + pL H-1 + qL HsL2 + sL3L
 
To find the optimal contract we have the following program: 
Maximize VBHHH B over values of (σBH1 B, σ BH2 B, σBH3 B, σ BL1 B, σBL2 B, σ BL3 B), subject to: 
(A1)     λcons, γ1cons, γ2cons,…, γ8cons ≥ 0; 
(A2)     σBH1 B, σ BH2 B, σBH3 B, σ BL1 B, σBL2 B, σ BL3 B ≥ 0; 
HA3L - k + 1
2
H-1 + 3 qL sH1 +
1
2




H-1 + 3 qL sL1 +
1
2
H1 - 3 qL sL2 ¥ 0
 
The method for finding the optimal contract for each level of monitoring 
resources, m, is similar to the methods used in the non-communication case and are not 
repeated in this part of the dissertation. 
10.1 Region 1 
Region 1 represents projects with high spread of project payouts and low cost of 
agent effort. This region is interesting as it will illustrate values of the parameters of the 
problem where sharing of interim monitoring information is never the strategy that 
maximizes the expected payoff to the principal. This will be in contrast to region 2 below 
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where sharing can be the best strategy, and the sharing of information will shift the risk 
between the two parties. 
In this region, solution of the linear programming methodology described above 
shows the only optimal strategy for the principal is to induce the agent to exert high effort 
in the first period and high effort in second period whatever the outcome of monitoring – 
strategy HHH. With this strategy, the agent’s expected compensation is at the reservation 
level. The form of the contract is: 
: 2 k H-1 + 2 q + p qL + H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
p qH-1 + 3 qL
, 0, 0,
2 k
-1 + 3 q
, 0, 0>
 
As with the no-communication case, in region 1, the principal can induce the 
agent to exert high effort in both periods with contractual means only; monitoring is not 
an optimal strategy. The same is true for the communication case. Since there can be no 
improvement in expected payoffs from the projects and since there will be no shifting of 
resources between the agent and principal, monitoring will not be an optimal strategy for 
these projects. 
Suppose the principal is obliged to monitor in this region because of some 
institutional requirement.TP61 PT Is communication an optimal strategy in these restricted 
cases? Given identical monitoring functions, the principal will be indifferent between 
communication and lack of communication. This is the case since in both instances the 
agent exerts high effort in both periods and receives expected payments at the reservation 
level. Therefore, there can be no improvement in the principal’s position through changes 
in effort or redistribution of wealth because of communication. 
                                                 
TP
61
PT For instance, a financial institution maybe required to monitor investments because of regulations or 
other institutional requirements. 
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The above conclusion is true since both contracts lead to the same expected 
payout to both parties and ensures the agent’s limited liability constraint is not violated. 
However, there are additional observations that can be made concerning the variance of 
the agent’s payouts. When interim sharing of monitoring results is agreed on, the contract 
is no longer strictly dichotomous; there are payouts in two possible outcomes. This is in 
contrast to the non-communication contract, which is shown below: 
: 2 k + R+ u
p q
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0>
 
Result XXIII: In region 1, there exist sub regions where the variance of the 
agent’s payouts is less if a communication strategy is adopted. 
Proof XXIII: Direct comparison of the two variances confirm this result. The 
regions where the variance is lower and higher are set out in appendix C. ▄ 
Therefore, use of a communication strategy even though it does not change the 
expected payouts of the principal or the agent would shift some risk associated with 
imperfect monitoring from the agent to the principal. 
10.2 Region 2 
Region 2 represents projects with high dispersion of profits and moderate cost of 
agent effort. In this region, solution of the linear programming methodology described 
above yields five possible communication contracts. The first contract is the same 
contract that induces a HHH strategy by the agent in region 1: It yields the reservation 
payment to the agent and induces high effort in both periods regardless of the results of 
monitoring communicated at time one. This contract will be defined as HHH1. The 
contract dominates other HHH contracts over the second region when: 
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H-1 + qL H2 k H-1 + 2 qL + H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
2 k H-1 + qL2 - H1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
§ p HmL < 1
 
The second contract is also a HHH contract but yields a non-reservation expected 
payout to the agent. This contract will be defined as HHH2. This contract dominates 
other HHH contracts over the second region when: 
1
2
< p HmL < H-1 + qL H2 k H-1 + 2 qL + H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
2 k H-1 + qL2 - H1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL  
The next two contracts are both HHL contracts. The first yields a reservation 
expected payout to the agent; the other compensates the agent with an expected payout in 
excess of the reservation payment. These contracts will be defined as HHL1 and HHL2, 
respectively. Their regions of dominance can be described as follows: 
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
§ k § -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
or
-
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
and
H1 + qL HR+ uL - "############################################################## ###########################################4 k2 H-1 + qL2 + 4 k H-1 + qL2 HR+ uL + H1 + qL2 HR+ uL2
2 k H-1 + qL
§ p HmL < 1
 
For the first, and 
-
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -





< p HmL < H1 + qL HR+ uL -
"##########################################################################################################4 k2 H-1 + qL2 + 4 k H-1 + qL2 HR+ uL + H1 + qL2 HR+ uL2
2 k H-1 + qL  
For the second. 
The final contract is an HLH contract. With this contract, the reservation 
constraint does not bind. This contract will be defined as HLH1. Its region of dominance 




2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -





< p HmL < 2 q-
è!!!!2 è!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!-H-1 + qL q
-1 + 3 q
or
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
§ k § -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
and
X1 + "#######X2
2 k H-1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL
< p HmL § 2 q -
è!!!!!2 è!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!-H-1 + qL q
-1 + 3 q  
Where 
X1 = 2 k H-1 + qL2 - H1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL, and
X2 = 4 k2 H-1 + qL2 I1 - 4 q+ 7 q2M
+4 k H-1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL I1 - 2 q+ 5 q2 M HR+ uL + H1 + qL2 H-1 + 3 qL2 HR + uL2 . 
To find the dominant communication contracts over the second region the 
expected payouts to the principal from each of these contracts need to be compared over 
their common regions of influence. The expected payout to the principal for each of the 
five contracts is given below: 
-2k - m- R + V+
1
2
H-1 + 3qL t - u for HHH1
 
-m -
2kq H-1 + q + 4p qL




H-1 + 3qL t for HHH2
 
-m+ k H-1 - pL - R + V+
1
2
p H-1 + 3qL t - u for HHL1
 
-m -
2kp H1+ pL q




p H-1 + 3qL t for HHL2
 
-m+
2kq H-1+ p - p2 + 5q - 7p q+ 3p2 qL









Results XXIV through XXVI establish the conditions necessary for HHH1 to be 
the preferred strategy. 
Result XXIV: In region 2, the set of parameter values for which HHH1 is the 
HHH strategy that maximizes expected payouts to the principal is a subset of parameter 
values for which HHL1 is the HHL strategy that maximizes expected payouts to the 
principal. 
Proof XXIV: The set of parameters where the HHL1 strategy maximizes the 
expected payout to the principal is a union of two disjoint subsets. These subsets span 
region 2 when considering the parameters q, k, and τ. In the first of these subsets defined 
by: 
-
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q  
There is no restriction of the p parameter. Therefore, to complete the proof it is 
necessary for the following condition to hold in the second of the disjoint subsets: 
H1 + qL HR+ uL - "############################################################## ###########################################4 k2 H-1 + qL2 + 4 k H-1 + qL2 HR+ uL + H1 + qL2 HR+ uL2
2 k H-1 + qL
§
H-1 + qL H2 k H-1 + 2 qL + H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
2 k H-1 + qL2 - H1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL  
Direct calculation shows this to be true within the sub set: 
-
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q  ▄  
Thus, in the region 2, the set of parameter values for which HHH1 is the HHH 
strategy that maximizes expected payouts to the principal is a subset of parameter values 
for which HHL1 is the HHL strategy that maximizes expected payouts to the principal. 
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Next, I will show that the expected payout to the principal is greater for the contract 
HHH1 when compared to contract HHL1. 
Result XXV: In region 2, the expected payout to the principal from contract 
HHH1 is greater than the expected payout from contract HHL1. 
Proof XXV: The expected payout to the principal from contract HHH1 less the 
expected payout from contract HHL1 is given by: 
-2 k - m- R+ V+
1
2
H-1 + 3 qL t - u
+ m- k H-1 - pL + R- V- 1
2






H-1 + pL H2 k - H-1 + 3 qL tL
 
This will be strictly positive if –2k – (1 – 3q)t > 0. This is true in region 2 ▄  
Since the set of parameter values for which HHL1 is the HHL strategy that 
maximizes expected payouts to the principal, and the set of parameters for which HHL2 
is the HHL strategy that maximizes expected payouts to the principal are disjoint and 
span region 2 then from result II, it is unnecessary to compare expected payouts to the 
principal from contracts HHH1 and HHL2. 
Result XXVI: In the set of parameter values for which HLH1 is the HLH strategy 
that maximizes expected payouts to the principal, the expected payout to the principal 
from contract HHL1 is greater than the expected payout from contract HLH1. 
Proof XXVI: The expected payout to the principal from contract HHL1 less the 
expected payout from contract HLH1 is given by: 
-2 k - m- R+ V+
1
2
H-1 + 3 qL t - u
+ m-
2 k qI-1 + p - p2 + 5 q- 7 p q+ 3 p2 qM










2 k IH1 - qL q+ p2 qH-1 + 3 qL + p I-1 + 3 q- 4 q2 MM




p H-1 + 3 qL t - u
 
Direct calculation establishes that this is strictly positive over the set of parameter 
values for which HHH1 is the HHH strategy that maximizes expected payouts to the 
principal. ▄  
Thus, result XXVI establishes that contract HHL1 is preferred to contract over the 
set of parameter values for which HHH1 is the HHH strategy that maximizes expected 
payouts to the principal. Therefore, results XXIV, XXV, and XXVI establish that 
contract HHH1 is the preferred communication contract in region in the region of 
dominance of HHH1. Thus, this contract will dominate other communication contracts 
over the entire region when: 
p HmL ¥ H-1 + qL H2 k H-1 + 2qL + H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
2 k H-1 + qL2 - H1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL  
The other four communication contracts will be dominant in sub regions of region 
2 in the cases where: 
p HmL < H-1 + qL H2 k H-1 + 2qL + H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
2 k H-1 + qL2 - H1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL  
To find the preferred communication contracts in this region for the four contracts 
it is necessary to find the intersection of the regions of dominance of the remaining four 
contracts and then compare expected payouts to the principal offered by each viable 
contract in the resulting sub regions. Using similar methods to those applied in results 
XXIV, XXV, and XXVI the conditions for the remaining four contracts to be optimal are 
set out in appendix D. 
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For the remaining four contracts, the set of parameters over which they are the 
preferred principal strategy are easier to interpret graphically as a full description using 
equations is cumbersome, as can be seen from appendix D. The first of these contracts 
also induces a HHH strategy by the agent but results in a non-reservation expected payoff 
to the agent. The second of these contracts induces a HHL strategy by the agent and 
results in a reservation expected payoff to the agent. The third of these contracts also 
induces a HHL strategy by the agent and results in a non-reservation expected payoff to 
the agent. The fourth of these contracts induces a HLH strategy by the agent and results 
in a non-reservation expected payoff to the agent. A summary of the regions of 
dominance of these four contracts is described in table 5. In this table for each column 
Π ≡ (1 – q)[2(1 – 2q)k – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/[2k(1 – q) P2P – (1 + q)(3q – 1)(R + υ)]. 
In addition, the contracts are described in terms of the sub-regions of region 2 




Table 5: Comparison of Regions of Dominance of Monitoring Contracts with Communication 
 Communication Contracts when p(m*) ≥ Π Communication Contracts when p(m*) < Π 
Region 2a HHH with binding reservation constraint. HHH with non-binding reservation constraint. 
Region 2b HHH with binding reservation constraint. HHH with non-binding reservation constraint, or HHL with binding reservation constraint. 
Region 2c, 
1/3 < q < 1/2 HHH with binding reservation constraint. 
HHH with non-binding reservation constraint, or 
HLH with non-binding reservation constraint. 
Region 2c, 
1/2 ≤ q < 1 HHH with binding reservation constraint. 
HHH with non-binding reservation constraint, or 
HHL with non-binding reservation constraint. 
Region 2d, 
1/3 < q < 1/2 HHH with binding reservation constraint. HHH with non-binding reservation constraint. 
Region 2d, 
1/2 ≤ q < 1 HHH with binding reservation constraint. 
HHH with non-binding reservation constraint, or 
HHL with non-binding reservation constraint. 
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The interesting comparisons arise when the principal can decide on whether to 
communicate the results to the agent at the interim stage. Referring back to the non-
communication case, region 2 projects were dominated by two monitoring contracts. 
Both contracts induced the agent to exert high effort in both periods. The first contract 
resulted in the binding of the reservation constraint and dominated for monitoring 
functions where the optimal level of monitoring is such that: 
p HmL ¥ H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR+ uL  
The second contract resulted in the non-binding of the reservation constraint and 
dominated for monitoring functions where the optimal level of monitoring is such that: 
p HmL < H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR+ uL  
Result XXVII: In region 2, communication is never an optimal strategy for 
projects with monitoring functions where the optimal level of monitoring is such that: 
p HmL ¥ H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR+ uL  
Proof XXVII: Direct observation shows that the second non-communication 
contract does not fulfill this condition. Thus, it remains to show that the first non-
communication dominates the five communication contracts in the region defined by: 
p HmL ¥ H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR+ uL  
Direct calculation shows that all communication contracts fulfill this condition 
with the exception of HHL2. 
For HHH1 the expected payout to the principal is given by: 
-2 k - m- R+ V+
1
2




This is identical to the expected payout from the non-communication contract. 
For the other three communication contracts, direct calculation shows that the 
expected payout to the principal will be less than that earned from the non-
communication contract in the respective regions of dominance. ▄ 
Result XXVII shows that the first non-communication contract dominates all 
communication contracts over its region of dominance. For the second, the analysis set 
out in result XXVIII below show conditions for communication to be optimal: 
Result XXVIII: In region 2 for projects with monitoring function optimal 
solutions of the form p(m*) < (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[2k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)], the HHH 
non-reservation communication strategy is dominated by the second non-communication 
contract. All other communication strategies in this region – the third communication 
contract that induces a HHL strategy by the agent and results in a reservation expected 
payoff to the agent; the fourth communication contract that induces a HHL strategy by 
the agent and results in a non-reservation expected payoff to the agent; and the fifth 
contract that induces a HLH strategy by the agent and results in a non-reservation 
expected payoff to the agent – are all dominant over the same sub regions described in 
the communication analysis. These results are summarized in table 5. 
Proof XXVIII: The expected payout from contract HHH2 minus the expected 




H-1 + 3 qL t - m - 2 k qH-1 + q+ 4 p qL




H-1 + 3 qL t + m+ 4 k p q
-1 + p + q+ p q  
=
2 k H-1 + 2 pL H-1 + qL q
H-1 + 3 qL H-1 + p + q+ p qL  
 
 130
This will be strictly positive when 1 – p – q – qp > 0, but since ½ < p < 1 and 
1/3 < q < 1, then HHH2 is strictly dominated by the second non-communication contract. 
For the remaining three contracts, the same methodology yields the solutions set 
out in appendix E. ▄ 
In a sense, the ability to communicate alters the marginal projects – those projects 
that are described as region 2 but are close to the boundary with region 4; these projects 
have a payout dispersion that is high but a small reduction in this dispersion level would 
convert these projects to moderate payout dispersion project found in region 4. Without 
communication, projects that are described in region 2 are subject to incentives and 
monitoring levels that induce the agent to exert high effort in both periods; projects that 
are described in region 4 are subject to incentives and monitoring levels that induce the 
agent to exert high effort in the first period and low effort in the second period. For those 
projects that lie close to the boundary of these two regions, communication of monitoring 
results at the interim stage allows the agent to change effort levels in the second period; 
thus, communication allows for an intermediate strategy for the agent. The principal 
benefits since the agent is encouraged to exert lower effort and this requires a lower 
transfer of wealth from the principal to the agent. The agent benefits because of a 
reduction in effort level when the principal receives an unfavorable signal from 
monitoring activity. 
Further analysis can be undertaken to understand which party benefits from 
communication and what are the mechanisms that generate this benefit. To study this 
aspect of the relationship, the analysis will be completed for HHL2 as the analysis is the 
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simplest and similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the other contracts. 
The following result is true for both HHL1 and HHL2: 
Result XXIX: In region 2, the expected payout to the agent is always strictly less 
if communication is the principal’s preferred strategy and HHL1 and HHL2 are the 
optimal contracts. 
Proof XXIX: Communication is a preferred strategy in regions where the second 
non-communication contract dominates other non-communication contracts. This 
contract rewards the agent with an expected payout in excess of the reservation payout. 
Since HHL1 yields an expected payout equal to the reservation payout then if HHL1 is 
the preferred contract, the expected payout to the agent is strictly less if communication is 
implemented. 
For the contract HHL2, the expected payout to the agent from the second non-
communication contract less the expected payout from the communication contract is 
given by: 
2 k H-1 + pL H-1 + qL
-1 + p + q + p q
-
k I-1 + p2M H-1 + qL
-1 + p + q+ p q
= -
k H-1 + pL2 H-1 + qL
-1 + p + q+ p q  
This is strictly positive since 1 – p – q – qp < 0. ▄ 
When the HHL2 communication contract is the optimal solution to the principal-
agent relationship, there are many effects on the agent. With communication, this 
contract dominates the non-communication, non-reservation strategy inducing high effort 
in both periods. The details of the five contracts and their expected payouts to both 
parties are set out in table 6.
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Table 6: Comparison of Contracts and Expected Payouts in Region 2 
Strategy Contract Expected Payout – Principal Expected Payout – Agent 




p H-1 + 3 qL
, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0>  
-m+
2 k q




H-1 + 3 qL t
 
k H2 - 4qL
-1 + 3q  




-1 + p + q+ p q
, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0>  
-m-
4 k p q




H-1 + 3 qL t
 
2 k H-1 + pL H-1 + qL





: k H1 + pL + R + u
p q
, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0>  











: 2 k H1 + pL
-1 + p + q+ p q
, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0>  
-m-
2 k p H1 + pL q




p H-1 + 3 qL t
 
k I-1 + p2 M H-1 + qL









2 Hk - 5 k q +4 k p qL
H-1 +3 qL Hp - 2 q + p qL
, 0, 0>
 
2 k qI-1 + p - p2 + 5 q- 7 p q + 3 p2 qM




H1 - pL H3 q- 1L t - m
 
k H1 - qL I2 p - p2 - 2 q - 2 p q+ 3 p2 qM




Consider the variance of the payout to the agent, where payout is measured after 
consideration of effort exerted. To calculate these values for the two contracts it is 
necessary to consider the payout in each possible contractual state and its associated 




Table 7: Payouts from the Second Non-Communication Strategy and from the 
Communication Strategy HHL2 
No Communication 
Payout to Agent, Net of Effort Probability 
4 k




–2k 1 – qp 
With Communication 
Payout to Agent, Net of Effort Probability 
2 k H1 + pL




–2k p (1 – q) 




The variance for the non-communication and communication contract payouts are 
respectively: 
16 k2 p qI1 - 3 p q + 2 p2 q2 M
H-1 + p + q + p qL2
and
 
Ik2 p I-1 + 12 q+ 2 p4 H-1 + qL2 q- 9 q2 + 2 q3 + p I3 - 6 q- 17 q2 + 8 q3 M
+ p3 I1 - 2 q- 7 q2 + 8 q3 M+ p2 I-3 + 10 q- 11 q2 + 12 q3 MMM ëH-1 + p + q+ p qL2  
Result XXX: In the sub region of region 2, where the communication strategy 
HHL2 is the optimal contracts amongst all monitoring strategies, there exist regions 
where the variance of the agent’s payouts are less than if a non-communication strategy is 
adopted. 
Proof XXX: Direct comparison of the two variances described above in the 
region of dominance of strategy HHL2 confirm this result. The regions where the 
variance is lower are set out in appendix E. ▄ 
Therefore, in some circumstances the use of communication reduces the variance of 
the payouts to the agent. Therefore, the additional risk, assumed by the agent due to the 
noise associated with the monitoring signal can be reduced by the communication of 
monitoring results at the interim stage. This reductions comes at a cost, however; the 
reduction in the expected payout to the agent. In order to understand whether the trade-
off is worthwhile – lower variance but lower expected payouts – changes in the 
coefficient of variation of project payouts will be considered. The coefficient of variation 
is defined as: 
Standard deviation of payouts / expected value of payouts to the agent. 
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Result XXXI: In the sub-region of region 2, where the communication strategy 
HHL2 is the optimal contracts amongst all monitoring strategies, there exist regions 
where the coefficient of variation of the agent’s payouts is greater than if a non-
communication strategy was adopted. 
Proof XXXI: Direct comparison of the two coefficients of variation in the region 
of dominance of strategy HHL2 confirm this result. The regions where the coefficients of 
variation is higher and lower are set out in appendix D. ▄ 
These results can be considered in terms of the general question as to when it 
would be advantageous for the principal to agree to share interim-monitoring information 
with the agent. Unless monitoring is perfect, the estimate of agent effort generated from 
monitoring will always produce a noisy signal of actual effort. Since there is some 
probability that the principal will receive the wrong signal, the agent will require a higher 
level of incentives to compensate for this risk.TP62 PT When communication is introduced into 
the model, it allows the agent to decide whether it is worthwhile to invest high effort in 
the second period contingent on the outcome of the period one monitoring; the results of 
monitoring will inform the agent whether high effort in the future has any chance of 
being rewarded. So for example, suppose the preferred effort level is for the agent to 
exert high effort in both periods. If at time one, the monitoring results produce the 
erroneous signal that the agent exerted low effort during that period the agent can now 
change his strategy in the second period. This will benefit both principal and agent since 
some of the risk associated with monitoring is shifted from the agent to the principal. 
                                                 
TP
62
PT This will be true even though the agent is risk neutral. Because of limited liability, the non-incentive 
components of the contract result in the agent losing his limited liability value, υ. Therefore, if the 
probability of receiving the incentive component is reduced because of imperfect monitoring, the value 
paid to the agent in that state will need to be increased to ensure the agent remains incentivised to work at 
the level preferred by the principal. 
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Since the principal does not have limited liability, the risk has no impact on the 
principal.TP63 PT 
Since the solutions to the principal-agent relationship were found using a linear 
programming methodology, there exist dual problems for the original primal problems. 
For example, the primal problem used to find contractual solutions that induce the 
entrepreneur to exert high effort in both periods is described by the following program: 
Minimize: 
H-2 k - R- uL l1 + k H-1 + pL l2 - k p l3 - k l4 - k l5
+k H-1 - pL l6 + k H-2 + pL l7 - 2 k l8 - k l9 - k l10  
over values of (λ B1 B, λB2 B, λ B3B, λ B4B, λ B5 B, λ B6B, λ B7B, λ B8 B, λ B9B, λ B10 B) subject to 
-2 p ql1 - p H-1 + 3 qL Hl3 + l4L +
H-1 + p + q+ p qL H-l5 - l6 - l7 - l8L + H1 - 3 qL l9 ¥ -2 p q  
Hp - 2 q+ p qL H-l5 - l6L + H-1 + qL Hp l1 - l7 + 2 p l7 - l8 + 2 p l8L
+H-1 + 3 qL Hp l3 + p l4 + l9L ¥ -H1 - qL p  
p H-1 + qL l1 + H-1 + 2 pL H-1 + qL Hl5 + l6L - Hp - 2 q+ p qL Hl7 + l8L ¥ -H1 - qL p  
2 H-1 + pL ql1 + H-1 + pL H-1 + 3 qL Hl2 + l4L
+Hp - 2 q+ p qL Hl5 + l6 + l7 + l8L + H1 - 3 qL l10 ¥ -2 H1 - pL q  
-H-1 + pL H-1 + 3 qL Hl2 + l4L + H-1 + p + q+ p qL Hl5 + l7L + H-1 + qL H-H-1 + pL l1
- H-1 + 2 pL Hl6 + l8LL + H-1 + 3 qL l10 ¥ -H-1 + pL H-1 + qL  
-H-1 + pL H-1 + qL l1 - H-1 + 2 pL H-1 + qL Hl5 + l7L
+H-1 + p + q+ p qL Hl6 + l8L ¥ -H-1 + pL H-1 + qL  
λ B1B, λ B2 B, λ B3B, λ B4 B, λ B5B, λ B6 B, λ B7B, λ B8B, λ B9 B, λ B10B ≥ 0. 
The solution of dual problem in each case confirms the results of the primal 
problem analysis in regions 1 and 2 and describes shadow prices for the constraints 
                                                 
TP
63
PT Of course, the agent’s still faces risk from his incentive contract as this is necessary to ensure the agent 
exerts effort at the preferred level. 
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described in the primal problems. For solutions of the dual problem where the reservation 
constraint was found to bind, the shadow prices for k and R + υ is 1. In other words, 
market conditions lead to a reduction in the cost of high effort, reservation payment, or 
level of limited liability then this will lead to a corresponding increase in the expected 
payoff to the principal. 
In the remaining solutions, the shadow price for R is always zero. This is not 
surprising since the reservation constraint does not bind in these solutions. For the HHL 
contract with non-binding reservation constraint, the shadow price for the agent’s cost of 
effort k is: 
2p q
H1 + pL H-1 + p + q + pqL  
Thus, a reduction in the agent’s cost of effort improves the expected payoff to the 
principal. This shadow price is strictly decreasing in both parameters. Therefore, projects 
with high levels of probability of success q, or monitoring intensity see less improvement 
in expected payoff to the principal from a reduction in the agent’s cost of effort, 
compared to projects with lower levels of the two parameters. 
For the HLH contract with non-binding reservation constraint, the shadow price 
for the agent’s cost of effort k is: 
2 H2 p - 1L H1 - qL q
H1 - pL H3 q- 1L Hp - 2 q+ p qL
when -
-5 + q+ "############################17 - 18 q+ q2
2 H1 + qL
§ p <
2 q
1 + q  
For all other values of the probability, p, the shadow price is: 
2 qIp2 H1 - 3 qL - 2 q+ 4 p qM
H2 - 3 p + p2L H-1 + 3 qL Hp - 2 q + p qL  
 
The shadow prices for the cost of effort for both HHL2 and HLH1 are lower than 
the shadow price when communication is not undertaken. Therefore, communication 








Part 2 of this thesis extends research on the relationship between principal and 
agent where moral hazard exists and contractual payments to the agent are restricted by a 
limited liability constraint. A simple model was used to investigate the impact of 
incentives and monitoring on this relationship. Actual contractual forms were derived and 
their structure was investigated. Furthermore, the effects of the impact of the 
communication of monitoring results at an interim stage was considered. 
When the principal is in a position to share the results of monitoring with the 
agent at an interim stage of the project, thus allowing the agent to modify his future 
effort, I find that sharing of interim information is an optimal strategy for “marginal” 
projects. Marginal projects are those that reside on the boundary between regions of 
projects that have differing levels of effort in the no-monitoring cases. The principal 
benefits since the agent is encouraged to exert lower effort and this requires a lower 
transfer of wealth from the principal to the agent. The agent benefits because of a 
reduction in effort level when the principal receives an unfavorable signal from 
monitoring activity. 
Since sharing of interim monitoring results can lead to reduced effort in the 
second period, and leads to contracts that payout in more than on sate of the world, the 
risk associated with monitoring can be shifted from the agent to the principal. Since the 
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Proof I: First, the contracts satisfy the limited liability constraints. For the two contracts, 
this will be the case if [2k + R + (1 – q)υ]/q ≥ –υ and 4k/(3q – 1) – υ ≥ –υ. This is the 
case for both contracts given the possible values of the parameters of the model. 
Next, both contracts satisfy constraints λcons, γ1cons, γ2cons, γ3cons ≥ 0. For the first 
contract since: 
λcons = q[2k + R + (1 – q)υ]/q – 2(1 – q)υ/2 – 2k – R = 0, 
γ1cons = 0, 
γ2cons = [(3q – 1)(R + υ) – 2k(1 – 2q)]/(2q), and 
γ3cons = [(3q – 1)(R + υ) – 2k(1 – q)]/(2q). 
For γ2cons, the constraint will be satisfied if: 
1/3 < q < 1/2 and k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 1/2 ≤ q < 1. 
For γ3cons, the constraint will be satisfied if: 
1/3 < q < 1 and k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)]. 
These two conditions hold when k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)]. 
Similarly, the second contract requires the condition k ≥ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)]. ▄ 
Proof II: Consider the payoff to the agent at a contract for which the reservation 
constraint binds. By definition, the expected payoff to the agent is R. Any connected 
vertex will also arise at the binding of the reservation constraint. Since the expected 
payoff is not dependent on the individual contractual elements, connected vertices do not 
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lead to a strict improvement in expected payoff to the agent. Since both principal and 
agent maximize expected payoffs then there can be no strict improvement in payoffs at 
viable contracts where the reservation constraint binds. ▄ 
Proof III: For the first contract, the reservation constraint binds and thus, by result II, the 
contract cannot be improved on. For the second contract, the γ3cons constraint binds. 
Therefore, to find a contract at a connected vertex the contract at the connected vertex 
will also arise from the binding of the γ3cons constraint.TP64 PT Any connected vertex will be 
found by increasing values of the second and third contractual payment at the expense of 
the first. Therefore, to demonstrate that there can be no strict improvement in expected 
payoff to the principal by using a contract at a connected vertex, it will suffice to 
demonstrate that a strict improvement in expected payoff to the principal does not arise 
from increasing the values of the second and third contractual payment at the expense of 
the first along the binding constraint. 
Suppose the second and third contractual payments change by the values δB2 B > 0 and 
δB3 B > 0, respectively. Since the γ3cons constraint still binds, the first contractual payment 
will transition to a new value σB1B, given by (3q – 1)[σ B1B – (δB3 B – υ)]/2 = 0, or σ B1B = (δB3 B – υ). 
This will yield a new contract: {δB3B – υ, δB2 B – υ, δB3 B – υ}. 
For this new contract, the expected payoff to the principal is: 
VBHH B = V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – q(δB3 B – υ) – (1 – q)(δB2 B – υ)/2 – (1 – q)(δB3 B – υ)/2. 
From direct observation, it can be seen that the expected payoff is a decreasing function 
of δB2 B and δB3 B. Thus, there is no strict improvement in payoffs by using contracts at a 
connected vertex. ▄ 
                                                 
TP
64
PT Other constraints will also bind at a connected vertex, but the γ3cons constraint will certainly bind. 
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Proof IV: The methodology will be demonstrated for one contract. Similar methods can 
be used to prove the results for the other contracts but are not shown for brevity. 
Consider the first contract {[2k + R + (1 – q)υ]/q, –υ, –υ}. For this contract to dominate 
other potential contracts, the expected payoff to the principal has to be greater than the 
expected payoff for both the third and fifth contract since their domains overlap. 
For the expected payoff of the first to dominate the third: 
V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – [2k + R + (1 – q)υ] + (1 – q)υ ≥ V – [k + R + (1 – q)υ] + (1 – q)υ 
Therefore, the necessary condition for the first contract to dominate the third is 
τ ≥ k/(3q – 1). 
For the expected payoff of the first to dominate the fifth: 
V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – [2k + R + (1 – q)υ] + (1 – q)υ  
≥ V – (3q – 1)τ/2 – [R + (1 – q)υ] + (1 – q)υ 
Therefore, the necessary condition for the first contract to dominate the fifth is 
τ ≥ 2k/(3q – 1). Combining this condition with the condition above and the original 
condition on the first contract, k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)], yields the conditions 
necessary for the first contract to be optimal: 
τ ≥ 2k/(3q – 1) and k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)]. 
The conditions for the other contracts can be established in a similar manner. ▄ 
Proof V: The results can be shown directly by differentiating each of the incentive 
components by the parameters under consideration. ▄ 
Proof VI: The incentive component of the contractual solution (N1) is: 
 [2k + R + (1 – q)υ]/q, and for N(2), 4k/(3q – 1) – υ. 
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From direct observation, both incentive components are strictly increasing functions of 
the cost of high effort, k.TP65 PT 
In figure 3, the boundary k = (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] separates projects with 
contractual solutions of the form (N1) and (N2), with lower values of high effort yielding 
solutions (N1), and higher values, (N2). By direct substitution, the incentive components 
of both contracts are identical at this boundary. Therefore, for contracts (N1) and (N2), 
the incentive components of the contractual solutions are an increasing function of the 
cost of high effort, k. 
A similar argument holds for the pair of contracts (N3) and (N4). ▄ 
Proof VII: First, the conditions in result IV can be rearranged to see the impact of the 
limited liability parameter υ. Consider the condition 0 ≤ τ ≤ 2k/(3q – 1). This condition 
represents the combined regions 7, 8 and 9 for all values of the limited liability constraint 
υ. The expected payoff to the principal in this region is given by V – (3q – 1)τ/2 – R. 
Since this is independent of the level of limited liability parameter then the principal will 
be indifferent between the two agents. 
Next, consider the conditions 0 < k ≤ (3q – 1)R/[2(1 – q)] and τ ≥ 2k/(3q – 1). This is a 
sub region of region 1 for all values of the limited liability constraint υ. The expected 
payoff to the principal in this region is given by V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – R – 2k. Once again, 
this is independent of the level of the limited liability parameter; therefore, the principal 
will be indifferent between the two agents. 
Next, consider the conditions: 
(3q – 1)R/[2(1 – q)] ≤ k ≤ (3q – 1)R/(1 – q) and τ ≥ 2k(1 + q)/(3q – 1)P2 P. 
                                                 
TP
65
PT As confirmed by result V(iii) above. 
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This region is contained in regions 1 and 2 above. For υ ≥ 2k(1 – q)/(3q – 1) – R, the 
region is contained in region 1, and for 0 ≤ υ ≤ 2k(1 – q)/(3q – 1) – R, the region is 
contained in region 2. Therefore, if υB1 B > υB2 B ≥ 2k(1 – q)/(3q – 1) – R, the principal must 
choose between two agents that will yield expected payoffs independent of the level of 
limited liability: 
V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – R – 2k. 
Once again, this is independent of the level of the limited liability parameter; therefore, 
the principal will be indifferent between the two agents. 
If 0 ≤ υB2 B < υB1 B ≤ 2k(1 – q)/(3q – 1) – R, the principal must choose between two agents that 
will yield expected payoffs of the form: 
V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – 4kq(3q – 1) + υB1B or, V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – 4kq(3q – 1) + υB2B. 
Therefore, the principal will strictly prefer the agent with the higher limited liability. 
If 0 ≤ υB2 B < 2k(1 – q)/(3q – 1) – R < υB1 B, the principal must choose between two agents that 
will yield expected payoffs of: 
V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – R – 2k and V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – 4kq(3q – 1) + υB2 B. 
For the second agent to be strictly preferred the following condition would need to hold: 
υB2 B > 4kq(3q – 1) – R – 2k. This will require both: 
4kq(3q – 1) – R – 2k ≥ 0     and     4kq(3q – 1) – R – 2k < 2k(1 – q)/(3q – 1) – R. 
Consider the first condition. This requires k ≥ (3q – 1)R/[2(1 – q)] which is consistent 
with the structure of this sub region. Consider the second condition. This simplifies to 
R > R, which is a contradiction. 
The results for the remaining sub regions can be proved in a similar fashion. ▄ 
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Proof VIII: The proof will be demonstrated for contract (C2): This will demonstrate the 
methodology used in proving the results for all three contracts but will occupy the least 
space in this paper. 
First, it needs to be shown that the contract (C2) satisfies the limited liability constraints, 
(A2). Since, given the restrictions placed on q we have 2k/[(3q – 1)p] > 0, the result 
follows immediately. 
Next, it needs to be shown that the contract (C2) satisfies reservation constraint, 
λcons ≥ 0. The following is the expected payoff to the agent, assuming that the contract 
(C2) induces high effort in both periods: 
2k(1 – 2q)/(3q – 1) – υ. 
The second contract will satisfy the limited liability constraint when: 
2k(1 – 2q)/(3q – 1) – υ ≥ R. 
Since the coefficient of k is required to be positive for this relationship to be true, then the 
second contract will satisfy the limited liability constraint when: 
1/3 < q < 1/2 and k ≥ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)]. 
It should be noted that this constraint binds only when k = (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)]. 
Next, it needs to be shown that the contract (C2) satisfies the constraint, γ2cons ≥ 0. The 
following is the expected payoff to the agent, assuming that the contract (C2) induces 
high effort in the first period and low in the second, 2k(1 – 2q)/(3q – 1) – υ. Since this is 
identical to the agent’s expected payoff from exerting high effort in both periods, the 
constraint γ2cons ≥ 0 is satisfied. Furthermore, the constraint binds for all permissible 
values of the parameters. 
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Next, it needs to be shown that the contract (C2) satisfies the constraint, γ3cons ≥ 0. The 
following is the expected payoff to the agent, assuming that the contract (C2) induces low 
effort in the first period and high in the second, k(1 – q – 2qp)/[(3q – 1)p] – υ. Therefore, 
the second contract will satisfy the constraint when: 
2k(1 – 2q)/(3q – 1) – υ ≥ k(1 – q – 2qp)/[(3q – 1)p] – υ. 
This simplifies to k(1 – q)(2p – 1)/[(3q – 1)p] ≥ 0. 
It can be seen immediately, given the restrictions placed on q, p and k, this constraint is 
satisfied and indeed, this constraint does not bind. 
Finally, it needs to be shown that the contract (C2) satisfies the constraint, γ4cons ≥ 0. 
The following is the expected payoff to the agent, assuming that the contract (C2) 
induces low effort in both periods k(1 – q)(1 – p)/[(3q – 1)p] – υ. Therefore, the second 
contract will satisfy the constraint when: 
2k(1 – 2q)/(3q – 1) – υ ≥ k(1 – q)(1 – p)/[(3q – 1)p] – υ. 
This simplifies to k(q + 3p – 5pq – 1)/[(3q – 1)p] ≥ 0. Since k, (3q – 1)p > 0, the second 
contract will satisfy the constraint γ4cons ≥ 0 when (q + 3p – 5pq – 1) ≥ 0. For this 
condition to be met the following has to be true: 
3 – 5q > 0 and 0 < 1 – q ≤ (3 – 5q)/2 and 1/2 < p < 1,     or 
  3 – 5q > 0 and (3 – 5q)/2 < 1 – q < 3 – 5q and (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) ≤ p < 1.  
For 1 – q ≤ (3 – 5q)/2 to be consistent would require 1 – 3q ≥ 0.  Therefore, if the second 
contract is going to satisfy constraint γ4cons ≥ 0 then it will require: 
3 – 5q > 0 and (3 – 5q)/2 < 1 – q < 3 – 5q and (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) ≤ p < 1. 




3/5 > q, q > 1/3, and 1/2 > q. 
Hence, contract (C2) satisfies constraint γ4cons ≥ 0 when: 
1/3 < q < 1/2 and (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) ≤ p < 1. 
Hence, considering all constraints (A1) and (A2), contract (C2) will be permissible if: 
1/3 < q < 1/2 and k ≥ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] from constraint λcons ≥ 0, and 
1/3 < q < 1/2 and (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) ≤ p < 1  from constraint γ4cons ≥ 0. 
The intersection of these two sets of conditions is given by: 
1/3 < q < 1/2 and k ≥ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], and (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) ≤ p < 1. 
The conditions for contracts (C1) and (C3) can be found in a similar fashion. ▄ 
Proof IX: The union of the regions of influence of (C2) and (C3) is given by: 
1/3 < q < 1/2, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], and 
  (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[2k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)] ≤ p(m*),     or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)], and 
  (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[2k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)] ≤ p(m*),     or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2 and k ≥ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)]. 
The union of this combined region and the region of influence of (C1) is given by: 
1/3 < q < 1 and k > 0, and 1/2 < p(m) <1. ▄ 
Proof X: For the first contract, the reservation constraint binds. Therefore, for any 
connected vertex, the reservation constraint will also bind. The expected payoff to the 
principal, when the reservation constraint binds, is given by V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – 2k – R – m. 
Since this is independent of the individual contractual payments, there is no strict 




As can be seen from the detailed workings of proof IX, the second contract arises from 
the binding of the γ2cons ≥ 0 constraint. Therefore, the contract at the connected vertex 
will also arise from the binding of the γ2cons ≥ 0 constraint. Suppose the second, third, 
fourth, fifth and sixth contractual payments are changed by the values δB2B > 0, δB3 B > 0, 
δB4 B > 0, δB5 B > 0 and δB6 B > 0, respectively. Since the γ2cons constraint still binds, the first 
contractual payment will change to a new value σ BH1 B, given by: 
(3q – 1)[pσBH1 B – pδB2 B + (1 – p)δB4 B – (1 – p)δB6 B + pυ)]/2 – k = 0. 
Therefore, we have a new contract {σ BH1 B, δB2 B – υ, δB3 B – υ, δB4 B – υ, δB5 B – υ, δB6 B – υ} where; 
σ BH1 B = δB2 B – (1 – p)( δB4 B – δB5 B)/p + 2k/[p(3q – 1)] – υ. 
For this new contract, the expected payoff to the principal is: 
V + (3q – 1)τ/2 – 2kq/(3q – 1) – m 
– (1 + q)pδB2B/2 – (1 – q)pδB3 B/2 – (1 + q)(1 – p)δB5B/2 – (1 – q)(1 – p)δB6 B/2. 
From direct observation it can be seen that the expected payoff is not a strictly increasing 
function of δB2 B, δB3 B, δB4 B, δB5 B, or δB6 B. Thus, there is no strict improvement in payoffs by using 
contracts at connected vertices. 
A similar result can be shown to hold for contract 3. ▄ 
Proof XI: The expected payoff to the principal from contracts (C4) and (C6) are 
identical: 
V – k – R – m. 
Therefore, contract (C6) is redundant in the region containing the intersection of the two 
contracts’ regions of dominance. Since the region of dominance of contract (C6) is 




Comparing the expected payoff to the principal from contracts (C4) and (C7) requires the 
following condition for contract (C7) to dominate (C4), k < (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q). This 
is outside the region of dominance of contract (C7). 
Finally, comparing expected payoff to the principal from contracts (C5) and (C7) requires 
the following condition for contract (C7) to dominate (C4), –(2p – 1)(1 – q)>0. Since this 
condition is false, the low-high effort strategies are redundant. ▄ 
Proof XII: The methodology used in this proof is identical to the equivalent result for the 
non-monitoring case (result IV in chapter 5) and is not repeated for this proof. ▄ 
Proof XIII: This is the case since in this region the agent can be induced to exert high 
effort in both periods and accept the reservation payment as an expected payoff through 
contractual means alone. Because monitoring is costly, and could not induce any greater 
effort or shift resources for the benefit of the principal, and since both participants 
maximize expected payoffs, it follows that monitoring is not an optimal strategy in this 
region. ▄ 
Proof XIV: In regions 7, 8 and 9, the principal’s optimal strategy is to encourage the 
agent to exert low effort in both periods both the monitoring and no monitoring case (see 
results IV and XII). This is the optimal strategy in both cases since the spread τ is 
sufficiently low and paying the agent for higher effort would not maximize the principals 
expected project returns. Furthermore, from result IV, the principal can extract the 
preferred effort level from the agent and pay him the reservation payment through 
contractual means. Because monitoring is costly and could not induce any greater effort 
or shift resources for the benefit of the principal, and since both participants maximize 
expected payoffs, it follows that monitoring is not an optimal strategy in this region. ▄ 
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Proof XV: If these projects existed, they would be found at the intersection of the 
parameter conditions of (N1), and (M2) or (M3), or (N3) and (M5). Direct comparison of 
the conditions for these contracts shows that these intersections are empty.  ▄ 
Proof XVI: The proof involves finding the intersection of the conditions for contracts 
(N2) and (M1), and (N4) and (M4) and establishes the sub regions in which the expected 
payoff to the principal from monitoring dominates the expected payoff to the principal 
from not monitoring. Since this can be done in a straightforward (albeit long-winded 
manner) the details are not included for this proof. ▄ 
Proof XVII: The proof is identical to the methodology applied to result XVI. ▄ 
Proof XVIII: The proof is identical to the methodology applied to result XVI. ▄ 
Proof XIX: The proof is identical to the methodology applied to result XVI. ▄ 
Proof XX: The proof is identical to the methodology applied to result XVI. ▄ 
Proof XXI: The proof is identical to the methodology applied to result XVI. ▄ 




CONDITIONS FOR SOLUTIONS WHERE MONITORING IS 
AVAILABLE BUT RESULTS ARE NOT SHARED 
 
 
The following relationships set out parameter values for contracts (M1) through (M6) 
described in result XII. 
{(2k + R + υ)/pq – υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ}     given 
 0 < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)], and τ ≥ 2k/(3q – 1) or 
{1/3 < q < 1/2, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)]}, τ ≥ 2k/(3q – 1), and 
  (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[2k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)] ≤ p < 1. (M1) 
{2k/[(3q – 1)p] – υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ}      given 
 1/3 < q < 1/2,  k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], 
  τ ≥ 2[k(1 – q) – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, and (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) ≤ p < 1, or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q),  
  2kq/(3q – 1)P2 P ≤ τ < 2[k(1 – q) – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, and 
  (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) ≤ p ≤ (1 – q)[4kq – (3q – 1)P2 Pτ]/[8k(1 – q) – (1 + q)(3q – 1)P2 Pτ]. (M2) 
{4k/(qp + q + p – 1) – υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ}      given 
 {(3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
  2k/(3q – 1) ≤ τ < 2[k(1 + q) – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], and 
  2k/(3q – 1) ≤ τ < 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), or 
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 1/2 ≤ q < 1, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
  2k/(3q – 1) ≤ τ < 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1)}, and 
  (1 – q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(k + R + υ)]/{(1 + q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(R + υ)] – 2k(3q – 1)} 
    ≤ p ≤ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[2k(1 – q) + (1 + q)( R + υ)], or 
 {(3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
  τ ≥ 2[k(1 + q) – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], 
  and τ ≥ 4kq/(3q – 1)P2 P, or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and τ ≥ 4kq/(3q – 1)P2P}, and 
  1/2 < p ≤ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[2k(1 – q) + (1 + q)( R + υ)], or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2 and {k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), and 
  2kq/(3q – 1)P2 P ≤ τ < 4kq/(3q – 1)P2P, or 
 (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] < k < (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q) , and 
    2kq/(3q – 1)P2 P ≤ τ < 4kq/(3q – 1)P2P}, and 
  (1 – q)(3q – 1)τ/[(1 – q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk] ≤ p ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q), or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] < k < (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), 
  2[k(1 – q) – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P ≤ τ < 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), and 
  (1 – q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(k + R + υ)]/{(1 + q)[(3q – 1) + 2(R + υ)] – 2k(3q – 1)} 
   ≤ p ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q), or 
 {1/3 < q < 1/2 and (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1 and k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q)}, 
  2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1) ≤ τ < 4kq/(3q – 1) P2P, and 
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  (1 – q)(3q – 1)τ/[(1 + q)(3q – 1) – 4qk] 
   ≤ p ≤ (1 – q)(2k + R + υ)/[2(1 – q)k + (1 + q)( R + υ)], or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], τ ≥ 4kq/(3q – 1) P2P, and 
   1/2 < p ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q).  (M3) 
{–υ, (k + R + υ)/pq – υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ}     given 
 (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – q)] < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), 
  2k/(3q – 1) ≤ τ < 2[k(1 + q) – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, and 
 1/2 < p ≤ (1 – q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2( k + R + υ)]/{(1 + q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(R + υ)] – 2k(3q – 1)}, or 
 {1/3 < q < 1/2, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)], and 
  2k/(3q – 1) ≤ τ ≤ 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2, (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)] < k < (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), and 
  2[k(1 – q) – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P < τ ≤ 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
  2k/(3q – 1) ≤ τ ≤ 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1)}, and 
 (1 – q)(k + R + υ)/[k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)] < p 
  ≤ (1 – q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2( k + R + υ)]/{(1 + q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(R + υ)] – 2k(3q – 1)}, or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/[2(1 – 2q)],  
  2k/(3q – 1) ≤ τ ≤ 2[k(1 – q) – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, and 
  (1 – q)(k + R + υ)/[k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)] ≤ p < 1. (M4) 
{–υ, 2k/(qp + q + p – 1) – υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ} 
 (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k < 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), 
  2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ < 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), and 
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  1/2 < p ≤ (1 – q)(k + R + υ)/[k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)], or 
 {(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k < 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
  2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1) ≤ τ < 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
 1/3 < q < 1/2, 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) ≤ k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), and 
  2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ < 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
 1/2 ≤ q < 1, k ≥ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
  2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2P ≤ τ < 4qk/(3q – 1) P2P}, and 
   1/2 < p ≤ (1 – q)(3q – 1)τ/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ – 4qk], or 
 {1/3 < q < 1/2, 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) ≤ k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), and 
 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1) < τ < 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1)P2 P, or 
1/3 < q < 1/2, k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), and 
 2kq/(3q – 1)P2 P < τ < 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
1/2 ≤ q < 1, k > 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
 2kq/(3q – 1)P2 P < τ < 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P}, and 
  (1 – q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(R + υ)]/{(1 + q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(R + υ)] – 4qk} ≤ 
   p ≤ (1 – q)(3q – 1)τ/[(1 + q)(3q – 1)τ  – 4qk], or 
{(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
 2k/(3q – 1) ≤ τ < 2[2qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, or 
1/3 < q < 1/2, 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q) < k ≤ (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), and 
 2k/(3q – 1) ≤ τ ≤ 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1), or 
1/2 ≤ q < 1, k > 2(3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), and 
 2k/(3q – 1) ≤ τ ≤ 2(k + R + υ)/(3q – 1)}, and 
 
 156
  (1 – q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(R + υ)]/{(1 + q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(R + υ)] – 4qk} ≤ 
   p ≤ (1 – q)(k + R + υ)/[k(1 – q) + (1 + q)(R + υ)], or 
1/3 < q < 1/2,  k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – 2q), 
 2[qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P ≤ τ ≤ 2kq/(3q – 1) P2P, and 
  (1 – q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(R + υ)]/{(1 + q)[(3q – 1)τ + 2(R + υ)] – 4qk} ≤ 
   p ≤ (1 – q)/(3 – 5q) (M5) 
{–υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, –υ, (R + υ)/pq – υ} 
 0 ≤ τ ≤ 2k/(3q – 1), or 
 k > (3q – 1)(R + υ)/(1 – q), 2k/(3q – 1) < τ < 2[qk – (3q – 1)(R + υ)]/(3q – 1) P2P, and 




REGIONS WHERE THE VARIANCE OF PAYOUTS FOR THE AGENT 
CHANGES WITH COMMUNICATION IN REGION 1 
 
 
Variance strictly decreases with the adoption of communication in the following 






, k § -
H-1 + 3qL HR+ uL










, k < -
H-1 + 2qL H-1 + 3qL HR+ uL





k H-2 + 5qL + H-1 + 3qL HR+ uL








H-1+ 2qL H-1+ 3qL HR + uL
H-2 + 3qL H-1 + 4qL
§ k § -





< p < 1 or
5
8
< q < 1, k § -
H-1 + 3qL HR+ uL





k H-2 + 5qL + H-1 + 3qL HR+ uL
2q H3k H-1 + 2qL + H-1 + 3qL HR+ uLL  
Variance strictly increases with the adoption of communication in the following sub-






, k < -
H-1 + 2qL H-1 + 3qL HR+ uL
H-2 + 3qL H-1 + 4qL
and
k H-2+ 5qL + H-1 + 3qL HR+ uL
2q H3k H-1+ 2qL + H-1 + 3qL HR+ uLL
< p < 1 or
5
8
< q < 1, k § -
H-1 + 3qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
and
k H-2+ 5qL + H-1 + 3qL HR+ uL
2q H3k H-1+ 2qL + H-1 + 3qL HR+ uLL





CONDITIONS FOR SOLUTIONS WHERE MONITORING IS 
IMPLEMENTED AND RESULTS ARE SHARED, STRATEGIES HHH2, 










2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -















2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § K@1D, T@1D < t < 4 k q
H-1 + 3 qL2






, K@1D < k < - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t <
4 k q
H-1 + 3 qL2
andP@1D § p < P@4D or
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k § -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
, t ¥ -
2 Hk H-3 + qL + 2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL





2 k H-1 + qL H-1 + 2 qL + H-1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL2 - H1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
or
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k § -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < -
2 Hk H-3 + qL + 2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
and
P@2D § p < 2 k H-1 + qL H-1 + 2 qL + H-1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL2 - H1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
or
-
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
, t ¥ T@2D and
P@4D § p < 2 k H-1 + qL H-1 + 2 qL + H-1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL2 - H1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
or
-
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@2D and
P@2D § p < 2 k H-1 + qL H-1 + 2 qL + H-1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL







§ q < 1, -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -




H-1 + 3 qL2
< t < T@2D and 1
2
< p § P@3D or
1
2
§ q < 1, -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
,
t ¥ T@2D and 1
2




H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k § -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < -
2 Hk H-3 + qL + 2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL




< p < P@2D or
-
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@2D




§ q < 1, -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t §
4 k q




< p § P@4D or
1
2
§ q < 1, -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -




H-1 + 3 qL2









2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § K@1D, 2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2











2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § K@1D, T@1D < t < 4 k q










, K@1D < k < - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t <
4 k q




< p < P@1D
 




CONDITIONS FOR SOLUTIONS WHERE MONITORING IS 
IMPLEMENTED AND RESULTS CAN BE SHARED 
 
 
For the second non-communication contract 
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k § -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < -
2 Hk H-3 + qL + 2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
and
P@5D § p § H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR + uL
or
-
H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k § -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
, t ¥ -
2 Hk H-3 + qL + 2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL





H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR+ uL
or
-
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q + "#############################1 - 6 q + 73 q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2 q + 3 q2L
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@3D andP@5D § p § H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR+ uL
or
-
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q + "#############################1 - 6 q + 73 q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2 q + 3 q2L
, t ¥ T@3D and
P@6D § p § H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL
2 k H-1 + qL - H1 + qL HR + uL
or
-
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
§ k § -




2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
and
P@6D § p § H-1 + qL H2 k + R+ uL







§ q < 1, -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q + "#############################1 - 6 q + 73 q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2 q + 3 q2L
,
T@3D § t < 4 k q
H-1 + 3 qL2
and
-t + 4 qt - 3 q2 t
-4 k q - t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t
§ p § P@6D or
1
2
§ q < 1, -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
§ k < -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t <
4 k q
H-1 + 3 qL2
and
-t + 4 qt - 3 q2 t
-4 k q- t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t
§ p § P@6D or
1
2
§ q < 1, -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
















2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § K@1D, T@1D < t < 4 k q











2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § K@1D, 2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2










, K@1D < k < - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t <
4 k q








H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
2 H-1 + qL
< k § -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < -
2 Hk H-3 + qL + 2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL




< p < P@5D or
-
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q + "#############################1 - 6 q + 73 q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2 q + 3 q2L
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2







§ q < 1, -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q + "#############################1 - 6 q + 73 q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2 q + 3 q2L
,
T@3D § t < 4 k q





-t + 4 qt - 3 q2 t




§ q < 1, -
2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q + "#############################1 - 6 q + 73 q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2 q + 3 q2L
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@3D and 1
2
< p § P@6D or
1
2
§ q < 1, -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
§ k < -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t <
4 k q





-t + 4 qt - 3 q2 t








2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § K@1D, T@1D < t < 4 k q
H-1 + 3 qL2






, K@1D < k < - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t <
4 k q
H-1 + 3 qL2







2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § -








< p < P@6D
 




REGIONS WHERE THE VARIANCE OF PAYOUTS FOR THE AGENT 
CHANGES FOR CONTRACT HHL2 COMPARED TO THE SECOND 
NON-COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 
 
Variance decreases in the following sub-region of region 2: 
1
2
§ q § Q@1D, -
2 H-1+ 3qL HR + uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3qL J7 + 11q+ "###############################1 - 6q+ 73q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1- 2q + 3q2L
,







-t + 4qt - 3q2 t
-4kq- t + 2qt + 3q2 t
or
Q@1D < q < 1, -
2 H-1+ 3qL HR + uL
3 H-1 + qL







-t + 4qt - 3q2 t
-4kq - t + 2qt + 3q2 t
or
Q@1D < q < 1, K@2D < k < -
H-1 + 3qL J7 + 11q+ "###############################1 - 6q + 73q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1- 2q + 3q2L
,
T@3D § t < T@4D and
1
2
< p < P@7D or
Q@1D < q < 1, K@2D < k < -
H-1 + 3qL J7 + 11q+ "###############################1 - 6q + 73q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1- 2q + 3q2L
,







-t + 4qt - 3q2 t




§ q § Q@1D, -
2 H-1+ 3qL HR + uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3qL J7 + 11q+ "###############################1 - 6q+ 73q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1- 2q + 3q2L
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3qL2
§ t < T@3D and
1
2




Q@1D < q < 1, -
2 H-1+ 3qL HR + uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < K@2D,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3qL2
§ t < T@3D and
1
2
< p § P@4D or
Q@1D < q < 1, K@2D § k < -
H-1 + 3qL J7 + 11q+ "###############################1 - 6q + 73q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1- 2q + 3q2L
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3qL2
§ t < T@3D and
1
2
< p < P@7D or
1
2
§ q § Q@1D, -
H-1+ 3qL J7 + 11q + "###############################1- 6q + 73q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2q+ 3q2L
§ k < -
H-1 + 3qL HR + uL
-1+ q
,









-t + 4qt - 3q2 t
-4kq - t + 2qt + 3q2 t
or
Q@1D < q < 1, -
H-1+ 3qL J7 + 11q + "###############################1- 6q + 73q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2q+ 3q2L
§ k < K@3D,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3qL2
§ t < T@4D and
1
2
< p < P@7D or
Q@1D < q < 1, -
H-1+ 3qL J7 + 11q + "###############################1- 6q + 73q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2q+ 3q2L
§ k < K@3D,







-t + 4qt - 3q2 t
-4kq- t + 2qt + 3q2 t
or
Q@1D < q < 1, K@3D § k < -
H-1 + 3qL HR + uL
-1+ q
,









-t + 4qt - 3q2 t
-4kq - t + 2qt + 3q2 t  
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Variance increases in the following sub-region of region 2: 
Q@1D < q < 1, K@2D < k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
,
T@3D § t < T@4D and P@7D § p < -t + 4 qt - 3 q
2 t
-4 k q- t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t
or
Q@1D < q < 1, K@2D § k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@3D and P@7D § p § P@4D or
 
Q@1D < q < 1, -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
§ k < K@3D,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@4D and
P@7D § p < -t + 4 qt - 3 q
2 t
-4 k q- t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t  




REGIONS WHERE THE COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF PAYOUTS 
FOR THE AGENT CHANGES FOR CONTRACT HHL2 
 
Coefficient of Variation decreases in the following sub-region of region 2: 
1
2
§ q § Q@2D, - 2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q + "#############################1 - 6 q + 73 q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2 q + 3 q2L
,
T@3D § t < 4 k q





-t + 4 qt - 3 q2 t
-4 k q- t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t
or
Q@2D < q < 1, - 2 H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k § K@4D, T@3D § t < 4 k q





-t + 4 qt - 3 q2 t
-4 k q- t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t
or
Q@2D < q < 1, K@4D < k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
,
T@3D § t < T@5D and 1
2
< p < P@8D or
Q@2D < q < 1, K@4D < k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
,
T@5D § t < 4 k q





-t + 4 qt - 3 q2 t




§ q § Q@2D, - 2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q + "#############################1 - 6 q + 73 q2 N HR + uL
8 H-1 - 2 q + 3 q2L
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@3D and 1
2
< p § P@4D or
Q@2D < q < 1, - 2 H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
3 H-1 + qL
< k < K@4D, 2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@3D and
1
2




Q@2D < q < 1, K@4D § k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@3D and 1
2
< p < P@8D or
1
2
§ q § Q@2D, -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
§ k < -
H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t <
4 k q





-t + 4 qt - 3 q2 t
-4 k q- t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t
or
Q@2D < q < 1, -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
§ k < K@5D,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@5D and 1
2
< p < P@8D or
Q@2D < q < 1, -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
§ k < K@5D,
T@5D § t < 4 k q





-t + 4 qt - 3 q2 t
-4 k q- t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t
or
Q@2D < q < 1, K@5D § k < - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL
-1 + q
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t <
4 k q





-t + 4 qt - 3 q2 t
-4 k q- t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t  
Coefficient of Variation increases in the following sub-region of region 2: 
Q@2D < q < 1, K@4D < k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
,
T@3D § t < T@5D and P@8D < p < -t + 4 qt - 3 q
2 t
-4 k q- t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t
or
Q@2D < q < 1, K@4D < k < -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2




Q@2D < q < 1, -
H-1 + 3 qL J7 + 11 q+ "#############################1 - 6 q+ 73 q2 N HR+ uL
8 H-1 - 2 q+ 3 q2L
§ k < K@5D,
2 Hk H1 + qL - H-1 + 3 qL HR + uLL
H-1 + 3 qL2
§ t < T@5D and P@8D < p < -t + 4 qt - 3 q
2 t
-4 k q - t + 2 qt + 3 q2 t  




DEFINITION OF PARAMETERS USED IN APPENDIX D THROUGH G 
 
Q[1] is the fourth root of the equation 
4 - 39 q+ 511 q2 - 2448 q3 + 6186 q4 - 4527 q5 - 4157 q6 + 3446 q7 + 1312 q8  
Q[2] is the second root of the equation 
-2 + 23 q- 173 q2 + 208 q3 + 1148 q4 - 3545 q5 + 1067 q6 - 446 q7 + 2136 q8  
K[1] is the third root of the equation 
4 k4 H-1 + qL5 I-1 - 12 q+ 9 q2 M + k3 H-1 + qL3 I-15 - 64 q + 346 q2 - 264 q3 + 45 q4M HR + uL
-3 k2 H-1 + qL3 H-1 + 3 qL I-7 - 25 q + 27 q2 + 13 q3M HR + uL2
-k H-1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL2 I13 + 26 q- 8 q2 + 6 q3 + 11 q4M HR+ uL3
-H1 + qL2 H-1 + 3 qL3 I3 + q2 M HR+ uL4  
K[2] is the third root of the equation 
2 k3 H-1 + qL H-4 + 7 qL I1 - 2 q+ 6 q2 + 4 q3 M
-2 k2 I-4 + 27 q- 62 q2 + 53 q3 - 34 q4 - 32 q5 + 16 q6 M HR+ uL
-k I-2 + 13 q- 27 q2 + 31 q3 - q4 + 2 q5 + 32 q6M HR+ uL2
-2 qH2 + qL I1 + q2 M I1 - q+ 2 q2M HR+ uL3  
K[3] is the third root of the equation 
k3 H-1 + qL3 I-4 - 41 q- 135 q2 - 115 q3 - 33 q4 + 112 q5 M
+k2 H-1 + qL2 H-1 + 3 qL I-12 - 79 q - 129 q2 - 29 q3 - 135 q4 + 24 q5M HR + uL
-4 k H-1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL2 I3 + 9 q+ 2 q2 + 16 q3 + 6 q4 + 6 q5M HR+ uL2
-2 H2 + qL H-1 + 3 qL3 I1 + q2M I1 - q+ 2 q2 M HR+ uL3  
K[4] is the third root of the equation 
2 k3 H-1 + qL2 H-1 + 4 qL I-2 + q+ 4 q2 M
-2 k2 H-1 + qL2 I-2 + 11 q- 7 q2 + 6 q3 + 8 q4M HR+ uL
-k I-1 + 8 q- 18 q2 + 34 q3 - 17 q4 + 18 q5 + 8 q6M HR+ uL2
+2 H-1 + qL qI1 + q2M I1 - q+ 2 q2 M HR+ uL3  
And K[5] is the third root of the equation 
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k3 H-1 + qL3 I-2 - 17 q- 47 q2 - 47 q3 - 139 q4 + 132 q5 M
-k2 H-1 + qL2 H1 + qL H-1 + 3 qL I6 + 25 q+ 20 q2 + 29 q3 + 12 q4M HR+ uL
-2 k H-1 + qL H1 + 2 qL H-1 + 3 qL2 I3 + 4 q2 + 2 q3 + 3 q4M HR+ uL2
-2 H-1 + 3 qL3 I1 + q2 M I1 - q+ 2 q2M HR+ uL3  
T@1D = J-2 k3 H-1 + qL3 I-1 - 10 q+ 3 q2 M - k2 H-1 + qL I-5 - 16 q+ 66 q2 - 16 q3 + 3 q4 M HR+ uL
+ 2 k H-1 + qL H1 + qL I2 + q- 10 q2 + 3 q3 M HR+ uL2 + H1 + qL4 H-1 + 3 qL HR + uL3 + "#######X1 N
ë I2 I1 - 4 q + 3 q2M Ik2 H-1 + qL2 H1 + 3 qL + 2 k I1 - 5 q2M HR + uL - H1 + qL2 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL2 MM  
Where XB1 B is defined as: 
I4 k2 H-1 + qL2 + 4 k H-1 + qL2 HR+ uL + H1 + qL2 HR+ uL2 M
x I-k2 H-1 + qL3 H-1 + 3 qL + 2 k I-1 + q- 3 q2 + 3 q3 M HR+ uL + H1 + qL3 H-1 + 3 qL HR+ uL2 M2  
T@2D = 1
4 H1 - 3 qL2 qHR+ uL
J4 k2 H-1 + qL2 + I1 - 4 q+ 3 q2 M HR+ uL JHR+ uL + qHR+ uL
+
"############################################################## ###########################################4 k2 H-1 + qL2 + 4 k H-1 + qL2 HR+ uL + H1 + qL2 HR+ uL2 N
+ 2 k JI2 - 7 q + 10 q2 + 3 q3M HR + uL
- H-1 + qL "############################################################## ###########################################4 k2 H-1 + qL2 + 4 k H-1 + qL2 HR+ uL + H1 + qL2 HR+ uL2 NN  
T@3D = 2 k H1 + qL + H1 + qL HR + uL +
"############################################################### ##########################################4 k2 H-1 + qL2 + 4 k H-1 + qL2 HR+ uL + H1 + qL2 HR+ uL2
2 H-1 + 3 qL  
T[4] is the third root of 
8k3 q2 I-1 - 4 q- 9 q2 + 2 q3 M + 2 k2 qH-1 + 3 qL I1 + 27 q+ 7 q2 + 33 q3 + 4 q4M t
-2 k qH-1 + 3 qL2 I9 + q+ 13 q2 + 7 q3 + 6 q4M t2 + H2 + qL H-1 + 3 qL3 I1 + q2M I1 - q+ 2 q2 Mt3  
T[5] is the third root of 
8 k3 q2 I-1 + 4 q- 9 q2 + 2 q3 M + 2 k2 qH1 + qL2 H-1 + 3 qL I1 + q+ 4 q2M t
-2 k qH-1 + 3 qL2 I3 + q+ 3 q2 + 3 q3 + 2 q4M t2
+H-1 + 3 qL3 I1 + q2 M I1 - q+ 2 q2M t3  
P[1] is the second root of 
p3 H1 + qL I4 k q+ t - 2 qt - 3 q2 tM + p2 I-8 k q- t + qt + 5 q2 t + 3 q3 tM




H-1 + 2 q+ 3 q2L H2 k + t - 3 qtL
 J2 k qH1 + qL + HR+ uL - 2 qHR+ uL
- 3 q2 HR+ uL - t + 6 qt - 9 q2 t + "########X2 N  
Where XB2 B is defined as: 
-4 k2 I-1 + 4 q- 3 q2 - 6 q3 + 2 q4 M + H1 - 3 qL2 HH1 + qL HR+ uL + qH-1 + 3 qL tL2
-4 k I-1 + 2 q+ 3 q2M II1 - 3 q+ 4 q2 M HR+ uL + q2 H-1 + 3 qL tM  
P@3D =
-2 k qH1 + qL + t - 6 qt + 9 q2 t + "########X3
H-1 + 3 qL H-4 k q + H-1 + 2 q+ 3 q2L tL  
Where XB3 B is defined as: 
qI4 k2 qI5 - 14 q+ 13 q2 M - 4 k H1 - 3 qL2 I1 - 3 q+ 4 q2 M t + H1 - 3 qL4 qt2 M  
P@4D = H1 + qL HR + uL -
"#########################################################################################################4 k2 H-1 + qL2 + 4 k H-1 + qL2 HR+ uL + H1 + qL2 HR+ uL2
2 k H-1 + qL  
P@5D =
2 k q+ H1 - 3 qL t - H1 + qL HR+ uL + "#######X4
H1 + qL H2 k + H1 - 3 qL tL  
Where XB4 B is defined as: 
4 k2 + HqH-1 + 3 qL t + H1 + qL HR+ uLL2 - 4 k IqH-1 + 3 qL t + I-1 + q+ 2 q2 M HR+ uL M  
P@6D = H1 + qL HR + uL -
"#########################################################################################################4 k2 H-1 + qL2 + 4 k H-1 + qL2 HR+ uL + H1 + qL2 HR+ uL2
2 k H-1 + qL  
P[7] is the second root of 
1 + 4 q+ 9 q2 - 2 q3 + p I-2 + 10 q- 22 q2 - 10 q3 M + p3 I2 q- 4 q2 + 2 q3 M + p2 I1 - 11 q2 + 10 q3 M  
And P[8] is the second root of 
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